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Strike Carriers were an important - some would say central - component of 
the United States Navy in the Post- World War II strategic environment. They are 
differentiated from other aircraft carriers by their offensive function, of 
projection o f air power against enemy forces. They included the attack carriers of 
World War II, the CVs and CVBs, which were eventually reclassified as CVAs 
(strike or ‘attack’ carriers) by the US Navy, during the period referred to as the 
‘New Look Era’. This was a period which, by way of definition, took a ‘New 
Look’ at the defence policy of the United States, arguing in favour of more 
firepower (including atomic weaponry) as a cheap substitution for the manpower 
which the armed forces had been building up under the previous administration. 
This substitution helped coin the phrase ‘more bang for the buck’, and was 
designed to keep the US economy on a stable footing.
The strike carriers’ role from WWIl onwards increasingly involved “over 
the shore” strikes against inland targets, due partly to the post-war environment 
lacking a pre-eminently naval foe to counter at sea. This dissertation is an effort 
to define the role o f the carrier in the period o f the Eisenhower presidential 
administration (1953-1961) by dealing not only with the years of the 
administration itself, but the thoughts of both the naval leaders and the president - 
himself a member of the armed forces - in the years leading up to the two 
presidential terms. In essence, the influences of leading figures such as Arthur W. 
Radford will be examined as a spur to the development of ‘supercarriers’ ; large, 
expensive models which this dissertation will contend were initially for use in 
delivering the atomic bomb, as is revealed in the ‘Unification and Strategy’ 
debates o f 1949, but were later developed as ‘multi-role’ platforms for use in all 
sorts of strategic scenarios, all of which came under the national security policy 
of ‘containment’ of the main threat perceived by the United States : the 
communist Soviets and Chinese. Their expense was justified by their versatility 
in a time of fiscal stringency during the period in question.
It is important to note that the disseifation covers, to a substantial degree, 
the events leading up to the Eisenhower adrriinlstration in an attempt to place that 
administration in the context o f its immediate predecessor. The policies initiated
under Eisenhower have been seen as a reaction to those imposed on the US 
armed serviees and foreign policy under Truman’s presidency. In for example, 
the ‘containment’ of communism was first officially proposed by George Kennan 
while Truman was in power, and the first supercarrier - United States - was 
cancelled under his administration. The first ‘supercarrier’ which was actually 
completed was being designed and built while a “limited war” was ongoing in 
Korea, under the Truman administration’s direction, and its design was 
influenced by that conflict, as well as the technological advances which were 
advancing carrier design at great pace. “Limited wars” were not discussed as part 
o f the Unification and Strategy hearings of 1949, but would play an increased 
role in naval thinking during the ‘New Look’, whieh sought alternatives to 
fighting other “Koreas”.
Three distinctive roles emerge. The use of the strike carrier to directly 
support limited-intensity engagements - the prime example of this being the 
Korean War - referred to in the title as intervention; and the use o f the carrier as 
part of the ‘New Look’ : The Eisenhower administration’s plan to use the US 
atomic superiority to deter war with nuclear weapons and fight “general”, all-out 
war with nuclear weaponry to counterbalance the Soviet preponderance in 
manpower - referred to as deterrence. This dissertation will contend that the 
President himself wielded great personal influence over the national strategy, as 
can be seen from his pre-administration thinking.
The third role, one which is stressed by the Navy and historians such as 
George Baer, is that of the traditional function of “sea control”, which naval 
leaders saw as a necessary adjunct to the two missions described above: a 
mission this dissertation argues was required by the Navy for the security of the 
strike carriers before they were able to discharge either of the two missions 
outlined above.
The dissertation contends that the administration’s ideas about the use of 
strike carriers were different from the Navy’s, especially toward the end o f the 
period, under the Navy’s chief officer, Arleigh Burke, a critic o f the “Massive 
Retaliation” style of deterrence advocated by the New Look’s originators, and the 
man responsible for the building of the Navy’s ‘alternative’ deterrent force, the 
Polaris missile-armed submarine fleet. It attempts to reach a decision on how the 
strike carrier’s role emerged from the debate : whether the strike carrier was in
the end a “limited war” weapon as Arleigh A. Burke thought - for use primarily 
in low-level conflicts - or as a weapon of deterrence whose main role was as a 
part of the American strategic retaliatory force under the Eisenhower New Look, 
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The United States Navy, from World War Two to the present day, has 
invested heavily in, and counted heavily upon the support of naval aviation. This 
thesis is an investigation of a specific period which saw a rebirth o f the carrier as 
part of the national strategy of 'containment', after the weapons system almost 
lost its way in the reorganisation o f the U.S. military services under a new 
Department of Defense in 1947. By 1949, the situation had become so serious 
that the carrier itself seemed to be on the way out, after the cancellation of the 
Navy’s newest, most expensive ever fleet centrepiece, the United States.
And yet by 1962, the Navy had 26 carriers in service, including six 
Forrestal-oX^iSS supercarriers and the nuclear-powered Enterprise. Between 1954 
and 1960 a modern attack carrier was built once per year, and in 1958 funds were 
set aside for the building of the most expensive ship ever built. That the Navy 
could lay claim to these funds was due to their argument that the carriers were far 
more flexible than the SAC’s ‘all-or-nothing’ systems. However, it appeared that 
this ‘second-honeymoon’ period was over in 1960 when the Eisenhower 
administration refused to ftmd a second Enterprise. This thesis will examine the 
reasons behind the funding of these carriers, and ask whether they had been a 
wise investment, and in what capacity they proved themselves to be most useful, 
and more to the point, how were they actually used - as an alternative strategic 
striking force, a sea control weapon, or as a force for limited conflict or even 
‘gunboat diplomacy’ ?
An apt comparison has been raised by Clark G. Reynolds about the role of 
the carrier in the ‘New Look’ era in Paul B. Ryan’s book. First Line o f Defense, 
wherein he parallels the United States Navy of the cold war with that o f Britain’s 
in the previous century :
Great Britain had since 1815 been using its Navy both to deter major war in Europe and to 
police the sea-lanes o f the world on which its prosperity and indeed its democracy rested. The 
agent o f its deterrence (a passive presence) was its battleship fleet; that o f its policing (an active 
role) its gunboats. The former, glamorous and obvious, demanded the major share o f the defense 
budget and the closest civilian control. The latter, unseen and unheralded, was administered at the 
tactical level by naval officers in remote seas ....
[A] striking parallel emerges between the above case and America’s passive defense force 
of the Polaris submarine missile fleet and the active policing role o f the aircraft carriers and
amphibious units... requiring tactical flexibility in the very real limited wars that the Navy has 
been fighting around the world since 1945. O f course, the roles often overlap and always defy 
shnple solutions.'
The roles o f the carrier and the missile submarine certainly did overlap. 
Before Polaris, the strike carrier was arguably carrying out both the deterrence 
and intervention roles for the Navy. It was certainly taking up the Tion’s share’ 
of the Navy budget, the argument for it being that it would have both a deterrent 
effect - backed up by a capability to deliver atomic weapons - with its regard to 
its presence off a foreign power’s coast; a presence which the Polaris submarine 
could never openly achieve, its movements necessarily having to be hidden - and 
a ‘policing’ role very evident during the Korean War, where the carrier launched 
air strikes in open support o f forces which Soviet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov 
termed “interventionists.”  ^Carrier presence in the Mediterranean and the Far 
East during the New Look era would also prove to be important for US interests. 
As Paul Ryan put it, they were “impressive national symbols” of the “Pax 
Americana
This is an attempt then, to clear up the overlaps - and provide some 
solutions - to the question of the carrier’s role in the New Look era.
The first chapter of this dissertation details the years preceding the 
Eisenhower administration’s ‘New Look’ at containment, and at America’s 
defence policy. In essence, a debate arose within the US Navy about the role of 
the carrier. Many within the Navy’s aviation branch regarded the carrier as the 
capital ship of the fleet and demanded an air-atomic mission for it to strategically 
rival the Air Force. Although Dean Allard contends that “most naval leaders did 
not consider the ship’s nuclear capability to be a dramatic departure or an attempt 
to deny the air force in its primary role in waging strategic warfare. Rather it was 
a logical corollary of the service’s ... task of attacking land targets from the 
sea,”'' this chapter will examine the extent o f the debate and the influential figures 
who might have earried on wishing for an increased stratégie role. This chapter 
will detail the Navy’s development of strategy within the context o f the atomic 
role. The Navy had to fight to keep control of its aviation from the hands o f the 
new Air Force in the first place, before internally raising the possibility of an 
alternative strategy to the Air Force’s long-range level bombing with carrier-
' Clark G. Reynolds’ foreword in Paul B. Ryan, First Line o f Defense. (Hoover Institution Press, 1980),
p. X.
 ^S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power o f the State (Pergamon, 1979), p240 
 ^Ryan, First Line o f Defense, p. 7.
'' Dean C. Allard, “An Era o f Transition”, in Kenneth J. Hagan, In Peace and War : Interpretations o f  
American Naval History. 1775 - 1978 (Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 294.
based precision bombing. Within the Navy, two distinctively different figures 
emerge who would be instrumental to the formation of the ‘New Look’ Navy and 
the national strategy during the Eisenhower administration: Admiral Arthur W. 
Radford perhaps best represents the Navy’s increasingly loud calls for a strategic 
carrier force in the run-up to the New Look. He would later be called upon to 
serve as the Chairman o f the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Eisenhower. Indeed, the 
term ‘New Look’ has in fact been attributed to Radford himself.
The other figure is Arleigh A. Burke, who wrote for the Navy’s General 
Board previous to the cancellation of the Navy’s first ‘supercarrier’, and urged 
the Navy to ‘stick to basics’ - tactical use of the A-bomb as part of a sea control 
mission ; the anti-submarine “attack at the source” role. As Chief o f Naval 
Operations, his “Navy of the 1970-Era” would emphasise the utility of the 
carrier in limited wars. Under his tenure, the Polaris ballistic missile was 
developed, thus reopening the debate about the carrier’s role.
One of the most important areas to be examined is the carrier’s role as 
perceived by the administration and by the Navy itself - and the translation of 
that role to actual operations - both before and after the development of the 
Polaris missile and submarine. As will be shown, this was a serious attempt to 
develop what would be a system solely for the deterrent role, one that would be 
secured from a ‘first strike’ nuclear attack, and the first such system to seriously 
rival the carrier’s delivery of the atomic weapon within the Navy itself, although 
the Navy would continue to push the carrier’s atomic-delivery capabilities. The 
issue at the heart of the carrier’s role was the priority assigned to deterrent 
weapons by the Eisenhower administration, according to Floyd D. Kennedy :
The navy sought to ensure that its carriers, as well as the Polaris submarines then on the 
building ways, would be included in the strategic forces ... because inclusion would mean 
assured funding as an element o f the American strategic posture. Exclusion, on the other hand, 
could mean an insecure appropriations future.^
This was an attempt to keep the carrier in a deterrent role at the same time 
that the Navy’s chief officer, Admiral Arleigh Burke, propounded that the “Navy 
of the 1970-Era” would be one in which the Polaris would indeed be a deterrent 
weapon, and the strike carrier too, in a backup role, while it also discharged the 
Navy responsibilities to any future ‘limited wars’ such as Korea. This vital memo 
and the administration’s reaction to it will be vital to an understanding of the
 ^Floyd D. Kennedy Jr., “The Creation o f the Cold War Navy, 1953 - 1962”, in Kenneth J. Hagan, In 
Peace and War : Interpretations o f American Naval History. 1775 - 1978 (Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 
307.
attack carrier’s role. By way of contrast, George Baer has stated that the Navy of 
the New Look period forgot the basics o f naval strategy at its peril :
Conceptually, sea control had to underlie all Navy missions. Sea control was the Navy’s 
main reason for existence. Sea control validated the service to the public. It gave the service 
coherence. Officers forgot sea control at their peril.^
Also providing clues will be an examination of the design and deployment 
o f the supercarriers United States, and the Forrestal-cXdiSs carriers. Therefore the 
design and development of these carriers will be detailed, and connected to 
perceived roles and missions. Considering that one carrier type was never 
deployed and the other continued to see action throughout the New Look era and 
well beyond, it seems logical to conclude that these carriers were conceived 
under widely different circumstances and with different roles in mind. The 
Unification and Strategy Hearings which resulted in the so-called ‘revolt of the 
admirals’ and the dismissal of Chief of Naval Operations Denfeld, according to 
Harold Stein, are more interesting for what they leave out rather than what they 
contain.^ Both sides of the debate, according to him, concentrated on strategic 
bombing with the atom bomb almost as if they were talking about the strategic 
bombing of World War II. No mention is made of limited war, or of imminent 
Russian possession of the Atom Bomb in the hearings. These are things this 
dissertation will talk about though, putting them in the context of the carrier. 
There will be a perusal of the differences in carrier design and the effect on US 
Naval strategy which accompanied them, contending that traditional US Navy 
arguments of ‘flexibility’ were better served by the design of the Forrestal in a 
‘multi-purpose’ role, rather than the narrower atomic strike role proposed for the 
United States. Floyd Kennedy, for example, has stated that the Korean War, 
during which the first Forrestal was designed, helped to shape the Navy 
throughout the 1950s and early -60s®, despite the Eisenhower administration’s 
stated intent to shift national strategy away from further involvement in similar 
conflicts. The continued appropriation of supercarriers under that administration 
becomes increasingly intriguing in that light.
Finally, the carrier’s role will be placed in the wider context of the 
‘containment of communism’ strategy of the United States. This was the nation’s
^Baer, George, 100 Years o f Sea Power : The U.S. N aw  1890 - 1990 (Stanford University Press, 
1994), p. 337.
^Harold Stein (ed.), American Civil-Military Decisions : A Book o f Case Studies. (University of  
Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 565-566.
® Hagan (ed.), In Peace and War , p. 305.
foreign policy throughout the period and was consistently a defensive strategy 
concerned with the avoidance o f war, according to John L. Gaddis and Richard 
Smoke, two historians writing on US national security.^ The policies used to 
achieve ‘containment’ would change throughout the years though, from George 
F. Kennan’s original formulation of the policy in 1946 and the publication of his 
views as ‘Mr. X ’ in 1947, through the ‘revamped’ containment policies of NSC- 
68 which envisioned an expanded military role whereby the ‘means’ would be 
‘measured against the m ischief, signalling the substitution of limited 
intervention rather than the all-out nuclear attacks the military had planned on. 
According to George Baer, for example, the decision to ‘limit’ war in Korea was 
strictly political.
Lastly, Containment under Eisenhower moved through two distinct phases : 
the first was characterised by contemporaries such as Maxwell Taylor and 
Bernard Brodie as “Massive Retaliation” after the speeches made by John F. 
Dulles about retaking the initiative and making more substantial use o f US 
strategic retaliatory power - although subsequent attempts have been made to 
signal subtle differences between the New Look and the Air Force’s ‘air power 
dogma’ under Truman. For example, a larger defence budget in peacetime to 
cope with the ‘long haul’ o f the fight against communism." The second phase 
was a reaction to criticism made of ‘Massive Retaliation’ due to Soviet 
technological advances in rocketry and hydrogen weapons, resulting in the 
‘graduated deterrence’ of the late 1950s, and the calls for a return to an NSC-68 - 
based strategy of ‘flexible response’, and an increased role for conventional 
forces. Increasing reliance on nuclear weaponry meant increasing the risks that 
went with employing weapons that might be termed ‘mass destruction’ weapons, 
even if they were of relatively low nuclear payload. In times of limited war, when 
one did not wish escalation, but planning was based on the use o f nuclear 
weaponry, the armed forces had a problem. Would the Navy be allowed to use 
the weapon once it got hold of it ? As George Baer asks, “Would the United 
States actually back up its threat ? Strategists could never be sure.” '^
All these containment strategies are then the context in which the strike 
carrier must be placed to understand the reasons for its development and its role 
during the New Look era.
The essence o f the problem for the Navy was how best to cope with the
 ^John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Contaminent. (Oxford University Press, 1982), p viii ; Richard 
Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma (McGraw-Hill, 1983), p47 
George Baer. 100 Years o f  Sea Power : The U.S. N aw  1890 - 1990 (Stanford University Press, 
1994), p320 
" Smoke, p67 
Baer, p341
administration’s insistence on smaller task forces which substituted manpower 
for firepower as part of the ‘New Look’. The armed services are not called 
services without a reason. They serve their administration. So the administration, 
arguably, is as responsible for the strategy of its services as much as the services 
themselves. Primary source material therefore comes from the Truman and 
Eisenhower administration’s documents as much as from the US Navy’s.
On the military side, important sources include the memoranda, memoirs 
and diaries o f major ‘players’ in the US defence establishment, including General 
Maxwell Taylor, and Admirals Arleigh A. Burke and Arthur W. Radford, to aid 
an understanding of the position of the Navy especially, and the military in 
general.
The major questions to be answered by this dissertation are as follows : 
firstly and most importantly : how did the Navy want to use the atomic weapons 
they were finally given for their strike carriers? And how were the carriers 
themselves actually used?
Did the Navy have an interventionist, limited war role as advanced by 
Arleigh Burke, and if so, was it a different role after the early New Look policies 
changed with the coming of the Soviet hydrogen weapon?
Chapter 1 : The Build-Up to the New Look
Paradoxically, one can begin to reach an understanding o f the difficulty the 
U.S. Navy had with how to use its carrier force by observing the means by which 
carriers were used during World War Two, the global conflict which many 
consider to be the aircraft carrier's finest hour. It is also an excellent example of 
the U.S. Navy's mission - Command of the Sea.
This then, is where the thesis will, begin, with a short history beginning 
with World War Two and continuing through the difficult immediate post-war 
years to the Korean conflict which changed many minds about United States 
foreign policy in general and the role of the carrier in particular.
Post-W ar Am erica and Unification:
New Challenges
“It is a matter of historical record, and not one that fm  proud of, that never before had 
such a mighty army, navy and air force been so quickly destroyed as were those o f the United 
States in the Period August 1945 - July 1946.” Admiral Arthur W. Radford
What one has to remember is that before WWII, the carrier had been seen 
as an auxiliary to the battleship, which was expected to be the main provider of 
naval offensive power, at least against other navies. Even considering the attack 
on Pearl Harbor as a brilliant tactical offensive operation, the main targets were 
battleships. Japanese naval doctrine envisioned the battleship as the heart of the 
fleet. In fact, the biggest ship afloat at the time was a Japanese 'superbattleship'.
After Pearl Harbor, however, the U.S. Fleet had very little choice but to fall 
back on the carrier as its most important capital ship. They were the only major 
offensive platforms left.
The beginnings of the carrier’s strategic strike potential really only 
appeared later on during the Pacific war when, for the first time, US carrier 
aircraft struck at the enemy’s industrial facilities and other non-naval targets.
Carrier raids were still limited to objectives relatively close to the coastline, 
however, and also against specific targets, rather than the area bombing of the 
Army’s heavy bombers. Precision strikes were necessary because the Navy’s 
relatively small carrier-based strike aircraft couldn’t carry enough bombs of 
sufficient size to do much great damage, and because the carriers themselves 
were too small to carry aviation fuel for more than a few days o f sustained 
strikes. Naval planning therefore emphasised the use of a small number of bombs 
dropped on important targets due to the limitations on size of both the carrier and 
its warplanes.'
Still, the way was prepared for Admiral Ernest King to advance naval 
doctrine by advocating the carrier for a more strategic role in the future in a 
report to the Navy Secretary in December 1945 :
Our fleet in World War II was not solely engaged in fighting enemy fleets. On numerous 
occasions a large part o f the fleet effort was devoted to operations against land objectives. A 
striking example is the capture o f Okinawa. During the three months that this operation was in 
progress our Pacific fleet - the greatest naval force assembled in the history o f the world - was 
engaged in a continuous battle which for sustained intensity has never been equalled in naval 
history ; yet at this time the Japanese Navy had virtually ceased to exist - we were fighting an 
island, not an enemy fleet.^
In terms of power projection - an offensive mission made possible by the 
sea control won during 1942 - the Pacific campaign was a great success. Neither 
the U.S. Army nor its air wing would have had much say in Japan’s imperial 
ambitions without the help of the navy. When the atomic bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima, it was possible because Naval Air had first secured a base for the still 
relatively short-ranged B-29 bomber. Power projected into the Japanese sphere of 
influence had to be assured first by sea control - provided by the navy - and then 
by the support of its carriers as marine troops established a platform for the 
retaking of islands. As regards the upcoming Cold War, however, there was no 
offensive Russian navy to fight, and limited opportunity to project power onto 
continental Russia. The offensive navy would be pressed to find a new mission 
for its carriers. This was the mission hinted at by King when he stated that the 
greatest naval battle the USA had fought did not involve an opposing naval force.
The United States produced a grand total of 110 carriers, 33 of which were
' Norman Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers : An Illustrated Design Historv (US Naval Institute, 1983), 
pp. 18-19.
 ^Ernest J. King, U.S. N a w  at War. 1941-1945 : Official Reports to the Secretary o f the N aw  ( 
Washington DC ; Department o f the Navy, 1946), pp. 169-170, cited in Baer, p. 286.
strike carriers (CVAs) such as the Æ'^^ex-ciass, which would continue to see 
service for years to come
After World War Two, the armed forces of the United States were 
drastically reduced in the effort to 'bring the boys home'. This was an extremely 
popular political move by the administration but one which horrified some in the 
military, who were beginning to see Russia as the next threat to national security 
even before the war's end.
Demobilisation, by 5 November, included a plan reducing the navy's attack 
carrier force to 3 CYB heavy carriers and 7 CV E^^ex-class carriers.® These 
would later be modernised, with reinforced decks and improved catapults, to 
facilitate the new je t aircraft then in development. Admiral Arthur W. Radford, 
who would rise to the Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of staff in later years, 
criticised the post-war plan as having too little striking power;
I am immediately struck by the lack o f carrier air power. There are ten active CV-CVBs. 
Their total embarked aircraft will number 1,150. In one carrier task force, their offensive striking 
force would never total more than 800 aircraft and would probably be less - yet this is the force 
that is to “strike hard and promptly forestall at its beginning any attempt to disrupt the peace of 
the world” ...
Therefore, until the world settles down - until we know where we stand - the Navy cannot 
afford to be conservative in estimating its needs for air power.''
Radford recommended that the carrier-air force be doubled in size and that 
the strike carrier be made the official backbone of the fleet.
1 believe that an air-sea Navy has a future, that a sea-air Navy is but a step removed fi'om 
the transportation service that extreme proponents of air power envisage.
1 believe that an early marriage with "Air" is essential to win the public confidence that is 
so necessary if  the Navy is to continue as an important arm o f the national defense. No more 
candy, flowers and promises, but a church wedding to which the public is invited.®
Those 'extreme proponents' were envisaging a future where 'Command of 
the Air' would supersede 'Command of the Sea', and long-range bombers would 
render the navy's power projection ability obsolete. In any ease, the most likely 
future confliet would be with Russia, a continental power, and with the aid of the 
atomic weaponry the United States still had a monopoly on, the war probably
®Stephen Jurika (ed.), From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam :The Memoirs o f Arthur W. Radford. (Hoover 
Institute Press, 1980), p. 74-75 (hereafter referred to as Radford Memoirsk
''Op. Cit. p. 75. 
®0p. Cit. p. 79.
wouldn't even last long enough for the navy to transport reinforcements to the 
battlefield ! A.P. Seversky's comments on sea power - made during WWII even 
before the explosion of the first atomic bomb, were gaining much weight with a 
publie whieh desired a simple solution to future conflicts ;
Clearly the time is approaching where even the phrase “sea power” will lose all real 
meaning. All military issues will be settled by relative strength in the skies. At that time, 1 dare to 
foresee, by the inexorable logic o f military progress, the Navy as a separate entity will cease to 
exist. The weapons it represents will have atrophied to the point where it is, at best, a minor 
auxiliary o f air power.^
At this time of great pressure for the navy, the National Security Act was 
just beginning to find its way onto the drawing board of Bill preparation.
Included in this act, which would be passed in July 1947, would be the 
'unification of the services under a new Secretary of Defense, who would 
supersede the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, and also the Air Force, which 
would finally gain independence from the Army.
In preparation for this act, the U.S. Navy set up SCOROR, the Secretaries' 
[of the Navy] Committee of Research on Reorganisation. This would be a small 
department of the navy (after 1947, under Arleigh Burke, a similar department of 
the Navy called Op-23 would perform much the same job), never reaching 100 
personnel, whose job it would be to enhance the public relations o f the navy and 
ensure it would be treated fairly in the upcoming hearings. The committee's job 
would be an extremely hard one, because the rest of the Navy didn't seem to feel 
the need for them, as Arleigh Burke relates :
Apparently the Navy thought that the overall requirement for control o f the seas was 
obvious and well understood by the Army and the Congress, and also that it is patently evident to 
everybody concerned with national defense that control o f the seas would require a strong navy 
capable o f defeating any force the enemy might use to contest that control.^
In fact, the Navy was being naïve, as General Alexander Vandergrift o f the 
Marine Corps was forced to say :
I feel that our Navy friends have rested too long on their laurels and the belief that no 
harm could come to them ... This is not the day when knighthood was in flower and it’s more
“"Alexander P. De Seversky, Victorv Through Air Power, (Simon and Schuster, 1942), pp. 182-183. 
^Arleigh A. Burke, The Reminiscences o f Admiral Arleigh A. Burke. U.S. N aw  (Retiredl. Vol. IV, 
(U.S. Naval Institute, 1979-83), p. 76.
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like a street brawl than a tilting joust.®
The dearth of stratégie thinking inside the Navy at this time is further 
indicated by George Baer, who recalls that, "in the Naval War College's copy of 
Vincent Davis's The Admiral's Lobby, at the place where the author argued the 
need for an effective public relations office in the Navy, a reader wrote, "A 
sailor's place is on his ship, a ship's place is at sea.""^
Radford knew better. Particularly revealing is his aecount of a luncheon 
with General Carl Spaatz o f the Air Corps before unification occurred :
"Tooey was frank. He wanted our naval aviation organisation in the new Air Force, which 
he felt would be set up in the near future. He intimated to me that we would be included whether 
we liked it or not, so he was really giving me a chance to voluntarily get in on the right side....
1... told him that I simply could not accept his offer, for 1 felt too strongly that such an 
organisation would not be in the best interests o f the United States and the anned services. I also 
regretted the situation I sensed was developing, a bitter fight between the Anny and Navy over 
this matter of Air.... [T]he Air Corps had already embittered the vast majority o f naval aviators by 
its tremendous propaganda campaign to prove it had won the war almost singlehandedly... "
Ironically, James Doolittle, whose B-25 bombers had hitched a ride on the 
H ornet, was one of the Air Power propagandists’ most vociferous anti-Navy 
spokesmen in the cause o f atomic deterrence, stating at one stage that "We can't 
deter Russian aggression with Navy weapons" and that when the Air Force had 
completed its bomber program , "we will not need carriers."" Clearly, the new 
Air Force would want control of all warplanes, not just the strategic bombers that 
they proclaimed would win the next war for the United States. In the event that 
this happened with respect to naval aviation, the result would be disastrous for 
Navy Air, whose job would merely be to maintain floating airfields for use by the 
Air Force ; presumably the Air Force would have chosen the strategy and the 
targets for those planes too, in view of the new Air Forces' "Atomic blitz" 
strategy. Admiral Burke, in his Reminiscences, was referring to this when he 
states that Radford was worried about the danger to the Navy's capability to 
control the seas, let alone any future attempts to project force ashore. In essence,
® Gordon W. Keiser, The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification. 1944-1947 : The Politics of 
Survival (National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 45.
^George W. Baer, 100 Years O f Sea Power: The U.S. N aw  1890-1990. (Stanford University Press, 
1994), p. 278-279.
"'Radford Memoirs, p. 82.
" Michael T. Isenberg, Shield o f the Republic : The US N aw  in a time o f Cold War and Violent Peace 
(St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 149-150.
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the Navy needed a sea-control mission. While Radford was alerting the Navy, 
congress and the public to the dangers o f a navy stripped of its air arm, Vice 
Admiral Forrest Sherman was developing a new strategy which would combine a 
sea-control mission with offensive carrier missions : Attack At The Source.
New Carrier, New Strateev
While the 'unification' wrangles were ongoing, other developments were 
taking place within the Navy. By July, 1946, Admiral Marc Mitscher was 
working on a new carrier design, the so-called CVBX. It was to have a 'flush 
deck', with no island structure, and would be far larger than any other Aircraft 
carrier in the world at that time. The flush deck would permit far larger, heavier 
aircraft, with greater wingspans, to operate from aircraft carriers. The concern of 
the Army Air Corps was that the B-29 sized aircraft it could launch would be 
used for strategic air war fare, thus challenging the unborn Air Force's primary 
mission. The official proposal for the carrier came on December 28, 1945, in a 
memo from Rear Admiral H.B. Sallada, the head of the Bureau of Aeronautics, 
to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Nimitz. The memo suggested that 
"serious consideration be given to the development of an additional type [of
carrier] that will accommodate aircraft o f about 100,0001bs with a 2000 mile
radius. The ship may be rather radical in design with, for example, no island and
no hangar. [The] flight deck would accommodate about 14 p lanes  500,000
gallons of gasoline would permit each plane about eight full-range flights."'^
Mitscher, as Deputy CNO (Air) suggested the accommodation of 16 to 24 
aircraft with enough fuel to fly four to six missions each.'® The important point 
was that the ship was being designed around the aircraft and ordnance it was to 
carry, and these would be heavy bombers. The nuclear bombs to be carried were 
still o f immense size and weight - early plans to modify existing carriers to carry 
nuclear ordnance would include provisions for handling a 'package' 15 feet long, 
weighing 16,000 pounds."
The planning called for four battlegroups consisting o f one of the new 
'supercarriers' embarking its strategic bombers, to be escorted by a modified 
Midway-C\2iss heavy carrier, two Essex- class carriers, and other surface escorts. 
These battlegroups would be deployed in the Mediterranean Sea on a rotational
Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, p. 241. 
‘® Op. Cit.
" Op. Cit., p. 291.
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basis, apart from one group based in the Pacific. Two groups were assumed to be 
involved in either maintenance or training, but the priority seems to have been to 
have one group available to strike from the Mediterranean at all times."
Between 1946, and the beginning o f construction in 1949, several 
modifications in design were thrashed out - for example, catapults and a hangar 
for the aircraft" - but even though these changes would increase the overall size 
and expense of the carrier, all the design changes still left the carrier with its 
flush deck. The final design had the fully loaded carrier displacing 83,249 tons, 
1088 feet in length, and with a 190 foot beam. The complement o f aircraft would 
comprise 18 bombers weighing 100,000 pounds each, and 80 fighters. 2000 tons 
of aircraft ordnance would be carried, as well as 8 five-inch guns, 16 three-inch 
guns, and 20 twenty-millimetre guns for self-defence.'^ In comparison with an 
Essex- class carrier o f World War II vintage, at a fully-loaded 36,380 tons of 
displacement'®, the United States would be truly huge.
At the same time, Sherman was developing a strategy that assumed that a 
war against the Soviet Union would involve more than a few days of atomic 
blitz. Worried that one single interpretation of future wars would unbalance the 
national strategy, Sherman proposed for the first time to use atomic bombs as 
tactical weapons, as part o f naval warfare instead of a substitute for it. Keeping 
carriers at the centre of the fleet, and presenting atomic strikes in the context o f a 
sea control mission, Sherman proposed to launch forward strikes to "attack at the 
sources of trouble", the bases of Russia's submarine force, which were of course, 
still conventionally powered in the 1940s and 1950s. Cut off their support, and 
the submarine menace and its endurance would be drastically reduced. Forward 
deployment of the expensive new carriers would have to contend with the land- 
based Soviet naval air arm too, so deep strikes against air-bases were also 
considered as part o f the sea control mission. The Navy had found a way to tie 
carrier strike projection to sea control, and the mission did not interfere with the 
Air Force’s strategic bombing mission against cities either. Sherman further 
envisioned support for army campaigns by strikes launched from the 
Mediterranean, thus giving the Navy a way to co-operate with the other services 
and hopefully, to lessen inter-service rivalry.
Importantly, this was a strategy which first signalled the use o f the atomic 
bomb as a weapon just like any other kind of ordnance, which would mirror the 
stated policy of the Eisenhower administration in the years to come. In the words
'® Op. Cit., pp. 18-19.
" Op. Cit., p. 242.
Op. Cit., p. 396.
'® Op. Cit., p. 394.
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of Arleigh Burke, "A weapon can be either tactical or strategic depending on how 
it's used - not on the weapon itself."'^
'Unification' passed Congress and became law with the Navy still holding 
on to its aviation. The Army lost its tactical air to the Air Force, though, and the 
tug-of-war between the services continued u n til, on 10 March 1948, the new 
Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, decided to hold a press conference stating 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) would meet outside Washington for an 
extended debate on "who would do what with what. If they fail, I shall have to 
make my own decisions."^"
The Chief of Naval Operations - the Navy's foremost officer - was Admiral 
Denfeld. He took his recently promoted Vice-Chief, Radford with him to the 
meeting chaired by Forrestal at Key West, Florida. The results o f the meeting 
finally cleared the way for the Navy to keep carrier-air :
"By Sunday morning the Chiefs were finally agreed on "certain broad, basic decisions."
1) For planning purposes the Marine Corps is to be limited to fbui" divisions....
2) The Air Force recognizes the right o f the Navy to proceed with the development o f  
weapons the Navy considers essential to its function but with the proviso that the Navy will not 
develop a separate strategic air force, this function being reserved for the Air Force. However, the 
Navy in the carrying out o f its function is to have the right to attack inland targets, for example, to 
reduce and neutralize airfields fi'om which enemy aircraft may sortie to attack the fleet,
3) The Air Force recognizes the right and need for the Navy to participate in an all-out air 
campaign.
4) The Navy is not to be denied use o f the atomic bomb.
5) Navy is to proceed with the development o f an 80,000 ton carrier and development of 
high altitude aircraft to carry heavy missiles thereft'om.^'
Just before President Truman was to announce officially that the USSR 
was the main threat to national security, the Navy had won approval for its new 
'Attack At The Source' mission and for the carrier and the aircraft to carry it out. 
The Navy might almost have been forgiven for resting back on its laurels, but
"'Burke, Reminiscences. Vol. IV, p. 497. 
Radford Memoirs , p. 114.
2 1 /‘Op. Cit., p. 114-115.
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events were to show that the challenge to keep that mission had only just begun.
The Cancellation of the United States
Although the wrangles involved with the ‘unification’ of the services 
appeared to have been dealt with by Secretary of Defense Forrestal, he was 
discovering that his authority was not sufficiently spelled out, and that the effect 
o f unification was instead a kind o f ‘triplication’.^  ^The question of ‘who would 
do what with what’ continued to haunt the armed services, especially regarding 
the use o f aviation. The acrimonious disagreement over perceived Navy 
‘duplication’ o f the Air Force’s agreed-upon primary role of strategic bombing 
would result in the cancellation of the Navy’s newest carrier within five days, 
and the controversial ‘Unification and Strategy’ hearings in 1949,^® chaired by 
Carl Vinson. Radford relates an example o f how Forrestal’s efforts to gel the 
services could be undermined by one service’s rivalry with another in his 
memoirs :
With a very limited staff o f his own, the Secretary would tell one o f his assistants that he 
wanted to hear presentations on such-and-such a subject by two services in order to ferret out 
“duplications” he had been told existed....
On the afternoon o f Wednesday 28 January, Army Brig. Gen. Leroy Lutes phoned to say 
that Secretary Forrestal had directed him to set up a presentation to be made sometime later that 
week ... on the capabilities o f naval aircraft. The Air Force was to prepare a similar presentation 
for the same tune. The idea was to give Mr. Forrestal information on the types o f planes each 
service would buy if  given additional funds...
The following day 1 received a telephone call from Mr. Larkin, also in Mr, Forrestal’s 
office, giving me a little more detail on what the Secretary wanted. The gist o f his call was that 
Mr. Forrestal had been questioning the performance and capabilities o f different types o f aircraft, 
particularly big bombers...
From the two phone calls and memoranda that followed 1 prepared to do two things : first, 
if  called upon... 1 would be ready to tell Mr. Forrestal what planes the Navy would buy if  given 
additional funds for fiscal [years] 1949 and 1950. 1 would be prepared to give performance 
characteristics for these planes and estimates extending such a program to a total o f five
Radford Memoirs, pp. 112-113.
®^ The National Defense Program - Unification and Strategy : Hearings Before the Committee on
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years... .This presentation was an elaborate one and would involve at least four or five assistants 
as well as the presenter...
On the day of the presentation, Radford recalls how he entered Forrestal’s 
office, but was only allowed inside for the conference on his own.
1 was surprised to find a number o f people in [the] office, mostly Air Force but also 
including Generals Gruenther and Lutes ... and several others 1 did not know. The Secretary, 
seemingly a little harassed, said that [assistance] could be brought in later but for now he wanted 
to get on with the presentations.
1 sensed that the presentations had been going on, that the conference had started some 
time before, and certainly that the ground rules for attendance favored the Air Force. It did not 
seem to be the cosy little informal affair that Mr. Larkin had described....
The Air Force finished and Mr. Forrestal called on me to give the similar Navy 
information, which I gave. That over. Lieutenant General [Lauris] Norstad gave a strategic 
presentation based largely on the performance figures o f the new aircraft that had just been 
described [by the Air Force - the B50C, which they expected to have in quantity by 
1952, and the aircraft Doolittle referred to as making carriers obsolete], which 
certainly left the naval air forces out in the cold. We were not counted in and very evidently not 
needed.
I was astounded. This was no small, informal presentation but a show staged with great 
skill and preparation
... .Mr. Forrestal turned to me and asked if  I had a strategic presentation to make. I said, 
“Mr. Secretary, I have given you the only presentation I was asked to prepare for you today. I will 
have a strategic presentation ready to give you next week but it will not fit very well with General 
Norstad’s ideas, which you have just heard and which are in many respects new to me.”
The room was very quiet after my statement. Mr. Forrestal hesitated a moment, then 
adjourned the meeting and left the room.... I was so mad I decided it was best to leave as quickly 
as possible and to find out later just what had gone wrong ... The Navy’s contacts with the office 
o f the Secretary o f Defense were not good and must be improved - soon!^®
Radford, the next day, told his CNO , Denfeld, that “in Mr. Forrestal’s 
office yesterday, the Navy was the country cousin, just asked to the party for the 
sake of appearances.”^^
In short, the Navy was limiting its use o f the atomic weapon to the sea- 
control function of ‘attack at the source’ whereas the Air Force, according to
Radford Memoirs , pp. 109-110. 
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Radford, wanted even that use of the atomic warhead denied to naval aviation.
Both the Navy and the Air Foree were developing strategies for use of the 
atomic bomb without political guidance at presidential level, and without that, 
the Secretary of Defense was limited in his authority to arbitrarily decide one 
way or the other without eausing an uproar. The president decided when and 
where to use the Bomb, but not what service got to use it for what purpose."" By 
the time of the presentation just described by Radford, then, voices within the 
Navy were adding to the controversy by advocating the use of carrier-borne 
aircraft to usurp the Air Foree’s ‘primary mission’ of stratégie bombing. One 
such voice was Rear Admiral (RADM) Daniel Gallery, who presented an 
argument early in 1947 to then-CNO Nimitz that the navy should be given 
responsibility for the initial delivery of the atomic bomb :
For the past two years our defense o f the Navy has been based mainly on old familiar 
arguments about exercising control o f the seas. Much has been said about antisubmarine warfare, 
naval reconnaissance, protection o f shipping and amphibious operations. It has been assumed ... 
that the next war will not be much different to the last one. This assumption is basically wrong, 
and if  we stick to it the Navy will soon be obsolete ... It seems obvious that the next time ... the 
outcome o f the war will be determined by strategic bombing .... The war will be won by 
whichever side is able to deliver the atomic bomb to the enemy, and at the same time protect its 
own territory against similar delivery . I think ‘the time is right now for the Navy to start an 
aggressive campaign aimed at proving that the Navy can deliver the atomic bomb more 
efficiently than the Air Forces [sic] can. ’ ”"®
This memo was leaked to the press months later, and immediately 
disavowed by Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan"® for fear of arousing Air 
Force indignation. But Gallery’s was not the only controversial voice to be given 
a public airing. In December 1947, Nimitz himself, on the occasion of his 
retirement, gave an address insisting that Naval Air could be used for strategic 
attacks “on vital enemy installations” above and beyond any naval-related sea 
control mission.®"
Another Admiral, RADM Edwin Cruise, had reached the conclusion that 
the Navy could better deliver the atomic bomb because it had developed
"" Baer, p. 293.
"® Unification and Strategy Hearings, in Stein (ed.), p. 480.
"® Baer, p. 295.
®" Nimitz’s farewell address is as CNO in 1947 is cited in David A. Rosenberg & Floyd D Kennedy, 
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precision bombing techniques to do so, rather than the Air Force’s area-bombing 
tactics :
Carrier attacks can be made not only on enemy urban and industrial targets, using mass 
destruction weapons, but with all types o f weapons against the enemy’s air forces and air bases 
... Such attacks can halt enemy bombing more effectively than can the destruction o f industrial 
targets. They can be carried out promptly by mobile carrier forces not dependent on prior 
acquisition o f overseas bases.®'
The argument here was that, in essence, the carrier was a better delivery 
system than the long-range bomber because it could not only deliver the bomb 
more accurately, but could do so from just off the enemy’s coast, without relying 
on a foreign nation to base the bomber or a long-range, unescorted flight before 
delivery. Consistent with the thinking on accuracy was the fact that at this point, 
atomic weapons were still relatively scarce. Even by 1949, the US arsenal stood 
at 150 A-bombs weighing around 10,300 lbs.®" Would counter-value, or city- 
bombing, be enough? Or would it merely increase the willpower o f an enemy 
who believed himself involved in a fight for survival only five years previously, 
and might believe it again ? Nimitz, and his successor, Denfeld, believed that 
strategic bombing alone would not be enough, and the Joint Chiefs agreed.®® So 
did Forrestal, in a diary entry in October 1948 which might have heartened those 
within the Navy who were afraid he might be wavering in favour of the new air 
power doctrine:
1 do not believe that air power alone can win a war any more than an Anny or naval power 
can win a war, and 1 do not believe in the theory that an atomic offensive will extinguish in a 
week the will to fight, 1 believe air power will have to be applied massively in order to really 
destroy the industrial complex o f any nation and, in tenns o f present capabilities, that means ah' 
power within fifteen hundred miles o f the targets - that means an anny has to be transported to 
the areas where airfields exist - that means , in turn, there has to be security o f the sea lanes 
provided by the naval forces to get the Anny there. Then, and only then, can the tremendous 
striking power o f air be applied in a decisive - and 1 repeat decisive - manner.®*'
Although Forrestal believed that the Air Force, upon the outbreak of war or 
shortly afterward, would “realize the diversionary possibilities” o f the carrier
®‘ Op. Cit. , pp. 73-75. 
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33 Baer, pp. 293-294.
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f o r c e , it appears clear that he felt the main responsibility of the Navy was 
control of the seas, with the carriers called upon as auxiliaries for strategic 
missions when needed.
The problem was not only that the Air Force had already secured strategic 
bombing as one of its primary missions - a term Forrestal further clarified at the 
Newport conference of August 1948 as being the missions for which each service 
“must have exclusive responsibility for planning and programming”, but 
nevertheless, “in the execution of any mission all available resources must be 
used ... For this reason the exclusive responsibility and authority in a given field 
do not imply preclusive participation.” "^^ - but also that within the Navy the calls 
for increased participation in the strategic role were by no means uniform. 
Arleigh Burke, on the Navy's General Board at the time, wrote a report entitled 
“National Security and the Navy’s Contribution Thereto Over the Next Ten 
Years” in 1948. It called for a basic sea control mission that prioritised command 
of the seas ahead of strategic bombing :
Within the foreseeable future, it will be necessary for the United States to control the high 
seas if  we are to project our offensive to the enemy in sufficient strength to be decisive. Sea or 
air raids will not likely bring about the defeat o f a strong enemy. Sustained heavy attacks will be 
necessary which will require shipping to support. The Soviet Union can presently and within ten 
years challenge our control o f the seas only by submarines and by air. ’^
The report added the warning that “we must be wary of our national 
predilection for panaceas [i.e. atomic bombs] which tempts us to act as though 
future possibilities are today’s facts. Concentration upon a single concept of war, 
method or tool is an almost irretrievable act.” ®^
The General board was not about to deny the air arm, though. It restated the 
attack-at-source strategy as vital to the sea control mission :
The submarine danger may become so great that the carrier task force initial effort may 
have to be devoted to destroying submarine bases or sealing submarine exits by atomic bombing 
ormming.
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In short, the conclusion of the General Board was that the Navy should 
stick firmly to its own primary mission of sea control, which in any case would 
“place so many demands on the Navy for immediate operations in widely 
separated parts of the world that fulfilment of all its demands may well be 
beyond the capacity o f the Navy in being.”'*”
The Navy, in contrast to the Air Force, was torn between strategies o f sea 
control and strategic warfare, but nevertheless desperate to gain an atomic 
capability. It tried to keep its intra-service debates internal, though, and as a 
result, the Air Force was pushing ahead in the ‘P.R. war’.
Eisenhower was being briefed by the services in connection with his role as 
an adjunct to the Secretary of Defense, and his briefing with the Navy indicated 
just how much the aviators were making in their push for air power, at least 
within the navy:
Have had two days briefing in Navy Department.
Interesting, and confirms impression that navy now views its mission as “projection o f  
American air power” against enemy.
Control o f Seas is not primary and exclusive function in this view...'**
Having had this briefing on the Navy’s role, Eisenhower then proceeded to 
detail his thoughts on the usefulness o f carriers, concluding that it would be wise 
to have them:
[General Vandenberg] will not agree navy needs any carriers larger than escort type. I feel 
that in first months o f war a few big carriers might be our greatest asset. I want to keep ten in 
active service - about which six to eight should always be in operation.'*^
Walter Karig, an experienced public relations man in the Navy, therefore 
wrote to Denfeld in 1948 with that explicit criticism. “The element of zeal, esprit 
de corps, all the devotion to a cause that the Air Force exhibits, is lacking.”'*^
Burke’s reminiscences contain his account o f a conversation with Truman 
about how “the Navy is very much in the same position with regard to public 
relations as a virtuous woman. Virtue is seldom spectacular .. and naval
'*” Baer, p. 298.
*^*February 2, 1949, Dwight D, Eisenhower : Diaries Miscellaneous (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 
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philosophy and maritime strategy are not spectacular either [in comparison to 
strategic air power theory] ... Success depends on long, dull hours of hard work 
and there’s no action that’s clearly decisive by itself
Little wonder that some within the service had chosen to jump on the Air 
Force bandwagon which had so captured the public imagination, and did indeed 
seem a decisive way o f both deterring and waging war to the vast majority of the 
US public. In fact, in October 1949, a Gallup poll was published in which 74% of 
the public believed that the Air Force would “play the most important part in 
winning another World War”. The Navy polled 4% After World War II, the 
US public knew all about and cared little for the prohibitive cost in lives and 
money for conventional war, especially if  there seemed to be an alternative. But 
if the Navy was being virtuous, its aviators were showing a little too much leg. It 
was about to be snapped off.
Leaked memos for the air force wolves to snap up were bad enough. They 
put the Navy in a bad light - trying to steal the Air Force’s mission. But at least 
the Navy had Forrestal as a Secretary of Defense, which Radford was particularly 
thankful for, crediting him with the balanced build-up of US forces necessary 
after World War II, “ almost singlehandedly ...I say singlehandedly because Mr. 
Truman, for reasons best known to himself, did not openly intervene to help out 
his Secretary of Defense.”'*^
Eisenhower decided to make comment on the situation in his diary in 
January 1949, accusing Truman of not doing enough:
I believe the president has to show the iron beneath the pretty glove. Some o f our seniors 
are forgetting that they have a commander in chief. They must be reminded o f this, in terms of  
direct unequivocal language.
If this is not done soon, someday w e’re going to have a blow-up... God help us if  we ever 
have to go up in front o f a congressional committee to argue our professional fights as each 
service struggles to get the lion’s share o f money.
The president could stop all this if  he’d act now.'*^
But Forrestal was to be replaced by Louis Johnson in March 1949, and 
Johnson, a long-time air power afficionado, having participated in the 
development of the B-17during 1937-1940, took charge. He knew little about the 
Navy, and was keen to save money on the defence budget. It didn’t take much
Burke, Reminiscences. Vol 2, p. 241.
Stein (ed.), p. 529.
Radford Memoirs, p. 118.
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nous to anticipate what would happen to the Navy ; cuts.
At one point Johnson commented that “the Navy has built its last big 
carrier.” At another he joked that he would let the Navy keep one carrier “for the 
old admirals to ride around on.”'*® The McNarney board of three high ranking 
“budget deputies” had been slightly more favourable. General Joseph McNarney 
“announced that he saw little value in the carrier force,” according to Radford, 
“and would have recommended its elimination except that we had a national 
commitment to keep one carrier in the Mediterranean. He also realized that a 
deployed carrier had to return to the United States from time to time for overhaul 
and repairs. For that reason he was willing to agree that the Navy should be 
permitted to keep two carriers in active commission!”'*^
The United States was expected to cost $189 million^” whereas a B-36 
bomber, at $5.7 million^*, presented a cheaper individual investment. With an 
overall budget of only $10.9 million to split amongst the services^^, someone was 
going to suffer. The United States was cancelled on 28 April, 1949, almost 
immediately after Johnson entered office. He had not informed anyone in the 
Navy in advance of the cancellation.^^ The uproar began with the resignation of 
John L. Sullivan, the Navy’s Secretary, who submitted a strongly worded letter 
of protest.
I am, o f course, very deeply disturbed by your action which so far as I know represents the 
first attempt ever made in this country to prevent the development o f a powerfiil weapons system. 
The conviction that this will result in a renewed effort to abolish the Marine Corps and to transfer 
all Naval and Marine aviation elsewhere adds to my anxiety. '^*
It must be highlighted that a member of the administration team, rather than 
a naval officer, was voicing these renewed concerns. The Navy once more began 
to feel outgunned by a combination of the Army and Air Force and this time by 
Johnson as well.
CNO Denfeld, described as a conciliator by historians such as Baer and 
Hammond, decided to go through official channels to defend the Navy against 
Johnson’s axe. He sent a memo protesting the cuts in the Fiscal Year budget of
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1951 to the Secretary on July 27, 1949, in an attempt to convince him o f the 
offensive value of seapower ;
The major task o f the Navy is not merely the protection of certain sea lines of  
communications, a defensive task. Instead, it is the broader task o f gaining and maintaining 
control o f the sea; i.e. the ability to use the sea for whatever purposes are necessary to us and the 
ability to deny its use to the enemy. ... Antisubmarine warfare limited to the defensive aspects is 
the most costly means o f combating the submarine threat. In areas ... such as the Northeastern 
Atlantic and the Northwestern Pacific, enemy surface and air opposition may be expected; in the 
Mediterranean, control would probably be vigorously disputed by intensive air effort... We 
cannot cut our naval cloth to the pattern o f  only one type o f  enemy opposition.^^
Burke came to the conclusion that “what we were trying to do was give a 
one-lesson course on seapower, and nobody learns anything in one hour.” ”^
Burke’s next major involvement would come with the Unification and 
Strategy hearings, when he headed Op-23, the Navy’s equivalent to Radford’s 
SCOROR committee, which prepared witnesses for the hearings. Unfortunately, 
another inflammatory leak by Captain John G. Crommelin - then on an inter­
service relations board, ironically enough, led to the New Navy Secretary,
Francis Matthews, coming down hard on public announcements by naval 
officers. He issued a communiqué ordering that public statements be channelled 
through his office, further damaging the Navy’s public relations. Many inside the 
Navy would not trust a Johnson appointee to air their views.
Vice Admiral (VADM) G. F. Bogan wrote to Matthews expressing his 
view that “there is no cheap quick victory possible between any two nations or 
groups of nations each having strong if relatively unequal power. Yet at a time as 
critical as ever existed during our history, the public has been lured into 
complacency by irresponsible speeches by advocates of this [Air Power] theory. 
The result could be a great national catastrophe.” ®^ Denfeld and Radford both 
baeked up his statement with those of their own, Denfeld in particular focusing 
on the dangers of air force control of naval aviation, and “reduction of seapower 
by those not thoroughly familiar with its capabilities.” ”^
Those “not thoroughly familiar” might have been taken to mean Johnson, 
and Secretary Matthews himself. Again, Crommelin leaked the Bogan statement
“Memorandum for the Secretary o f Defense: “Naval Forces for Fiscal Year 1951 Program,” 27 July 
1949,” cited in Gray & Bamett (eds.), Seapower and Strategy p. 329. [italics added]
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for fear that the Navy’s views would be hidden from Congress. And so began the 
so-called ‘revolt of the Admirals.’
During the Unification and Strategy Hearings themselves, Congressman 
Porter Hardy asked Matthews “what avenue a conscientious believer that a 
change is necessary in the interests of national security has to make his views 
known if he runs into a stone wall in his own department or if he gets blocked by 
the Department of Defense and can’t make his position known.”
Matthews’ reply was that “I don’t know how he could become blocked.”"*” 
According to the New York Times, published on 8 October, that answer 
was followed by “ a loud and jeering laugh of disbelief from his audience of 
naval officers.” ’^
Criticism of the officers’ testimony has tended to centre around the fact that 
there were several inaccuracies, one glaring example of which will be 
highlighted here, and that they should have attempted to present more of an 
alternative to the B-36 as a weapon rather than just denigrating it. According to 
Baer, the Navy was not ready to be put into the dock, and not prepared to 
respond to the news of the first Soviet atomic explosion. He criticises the Navy 
case as subject to constant political and technological change, and as a case that 
could be turned against the Navy. If Air Force bombers couldn’t get through, 
then how could the Navy’s ?
Above all, there was no public defence of the Navy’s sea control function.^^ 
Instead the Navy concentrated on rubbishing the ‘atomic blitz strategy.’ 
Radford’s testimony is a good example :
I do not believe the threat o f atomic blitz will be an effective deterrent to a war or that it 
will win a war. I do not believe that the atomic blitz strategy is generally accepted by military 
men. However, i f  after careful study o f all sides o f the question, the retaliatory atomic blitz were 
to become the detennined and studied policy o f the United States, then ... we are today capable 
o f procuring more effective and more efficient planes for the task than the B36.^^
What sort o f planes Radford thought might have been better than the B-36 
he did not say. Neither did he offer a strategic alternative to the ‘atomic blitz 
theory’ which he so roundly dismissed as a “fallacious concept.”®'*
Paul Hammond’s take on this was that it seemed probable that Radford,
®” Unification and Strategy Hearings, in Stein (ed .), p. 516. 
®* Unification and Strategy Hearings, in Stein (ed .), p. 516. 
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“while aware of the needs of limited war, felt that Congress would appropriate 
money for carriers only if convinced that carriers would be an important tool in 
blitz warfare.”®®
As it was, his complaint that the carrier’s cancellation should have never 
been allowed for the reason that it was an unproved prototype, and the B-36 was 
similarly unproved, yet being procured in great numbers, fell down on the fact 
that there could be no real test short of war.®®
Other witnesses, such as John H. Sides, a specialist in guided missile 
development for the Navy, spoke of the Soviet capability to bring down the B-36, 
without talking up the Navy’s ability to protect carriers against opposing 
bombers®^ and Capt. Frederick Trapnell, an aviator, presented a statement on the 
Banshee interceptor and its ability to take down the B-36, yet did not translate his 
attack on the Air Force weapon to a reason for the utility of the United States . ®® 
The Navy’s argument therefore appeared to be tinged by sour grapes.
Without doubt, the most contentious testimony was given by Commander 
Eugene Tatom, an aviation ordnance specialist, playing down the destructiveness 
of the atomic bomb in an attempt to steer air power strategy toward the naval 
precision bombing technique :
You could stand in the open at one end o f the North-South runway at the Washington 
Airport, with no more protection than the clothes you now have on, and have an atom bomb 
explode at the other end o f the runway without serious injury to you.®”
Radford, in his memoirs, remembers realising , “as soon as I heard the 
statement about standing in the open at Washington National Airport that it 
would cause great controversy and possibly vitiate the rest o f Commander 
Tatom’s excellent testimony.’”” In fact, it did far more damage than that. Johnson 
accused the Navy of a “campaign of terror," Melvin Price, on the Joint Atomic 
Energy Committee, accused the Navy of “surprising ignorance” of the effects of 
the atomic bomb.’*
The Senate’s leading authority on Atomic Energy, Brien McMahon, told 
the Senate that “it is dangerous to over-emphasize the importance of the atomic 
weapon, but God knows it may be fatal to under-emphasize it.” He further
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®’ Stein (ed.), p. 523.
®® Radford Memoirs, p. 185.
®” Unification and Strategy Hearings, in Stein (ed .), p. 
’” Radford Memoirs, n. 194.
’* Stein (ed.), p.522.
170.
25
accused the Navy of trying to usurp the Air Force role for its carrier, but “now, 
when the issue of the supercarrier has been decided adversely, the Navy finds the 
atomic bomb of small destructive force.
Air Force Secretary Symington retaliated at the Hearings by saying that the 
Air Force had been troubled by Nimitz’s statements in January 1948 about the 
navy’s strategic role, and reminded the Armed Services Committee that the Joint 
Chiefs had already approved strategic bombing as an instrument of war and had 
assigned it to the Air Force as a primary mission. The Joint Chiefs, o f course, 
including Nimitz and his successor Denfeld. He then proceeded to charge the 
Navy with imperilling the security of the nation :
It was bad enough to give a possible aggressor technical and operational details o f our new 
and latest equipment. In my opinion it is far worse to have opened up to him in such detail the 
military doctrines o f how this country would be defended. We have given the military leaders o f  
any aggressor nations a further advantage in developing their strategic plans by telling them so 
much about our own.’®
General Omar Bradley, then the Chairman of the JCS, was also particularly 
scathing of the Navy. “The careless detractions of this [atomic] weapon have 
done national security no good, and may have done our collective security, in 
these precarious times, untold harm.’”*
In conclusion, the Navy may well have been justified in regarding the other 
armed services as having joined forces against it. Indeed, the committee report 
“deplore[d] the manner of the cancellation o f the aircraft carrier USS United 
States’", but included no recommendation that a replacement be built.’® Denfeld 
was forced into retirai from the position of CNO, having disagreed with his 
Secretary’s testimony. Radford was sent to the Pacific command in Hawaii, 
symbolically as far away from Washington as possible, and Burke was actually 
held under arrest for some hours while the Op-23 office was checked for 
‘sensitive materials’. Matthews tried, but failed to stop him being promoted to 
Rear Admiral.’®
In conclusion, the hearings were a sorry episode for the Navy. No 
supercarrier, and no relief from Johnson’s cuts in favour of the Air Force 
resulted. The Navy’s break with the national policy of deterrence was firmly
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reined in. The ‘revolting’ Admirals had made a serious mistake in attempting to 
undermine what Colin S. Gray has referred to as "fhe security guarantor for 
Rimland-Eurasia [the countries friendly to the US, and upon whom it relied for 
collective security] against Soviet continental conquest or domination.””  It was a 
lesson well learnt for Radford and Burke especially, as will be detailed later on. 
Not only them, though. Eisenhower’s diary contains a scathing criticism of the 
whole debate, characterising it on 14 October 1949 as a “bitter figh t..., with the 
Navy still cursing the other services. The whole performance is humiliating - I’ve 
seriously considered resigning my commission, so I could say what I pleased, 
publicly.’”® He would not oversee such a split as president himself.
On the bright side, if this was the Navy’s darkest hour, an old saying 
springs to mind : ‘It is always darkest just before the dawn. ’ The ‘dawn’ would 
arrive in a war fought on and around the inappropriately named ‘Land of the 
Morning Calm’: Korea.
The Rise of Containment : NSC-68 and Korea
In order to understand the foreign and national security of the USA in the 
period concerned, one must go back to 1946, and examine a telegram sent by one 
George F. Kennan in response to the increasing puzzlement of his superiors back 
home at a rise in Russian vehemence toward the US in their leaders’ speeches. 
The reply was startling to say the least. In the words of John Lewis Gaddis, 
“rarely is it given to one individual to express, within the compass of a single 
document, ideas of such force and persuasion that they immediately change the 
course of a nation’s foreign policy. That was the effect though, o f the 8000 word 
telegram sent by Kennan on February 22, 1946.’”” It was later to be expanded 
upon for publication in the infamous ‘Mr. X ’ article in Foreign Affairs, “The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct”.®”
In summary, Kennan told the State Department back home that the Soviet 
regime relied on the presence of an external threat to remain viable. The 
disappearance o f the threats of Germany and Japan left the West, and particularly
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the United States, to fill the gap.®’
A note to the State Department on 20 March, 1946 has almost comic 
overtones today, but was deadly serious at the time :
We have come to the conclusion that nothing short o f complete disarmament, delivery of 
our air and naval forces to Russia and resigning o f [the] powers o f Govermnent to American 
coimnunists would even dent this problem [of disarming Soviet suspicions] : and even then - and 
this is not facetious - that Moscow would smell a trap and would continue to harbor the most 
baleful misgivings.®^
Just before the publication of the ‘Mr. X ’ article in July, Kennan became 
the head of new Secretary of State George Marshall’s ‘Policy Planning S taff in 
May, 1947.®® He had begun calling for a realisation that, under Truman’s austere 
post-war budgeting, interests should be contracted to fit means. He argued for 
‘particularism’ in American foreign policy, because the US was not strong 
enough - could not be strong enough - to hold the entire world under its sway and 
enforce its interests in that manner. This kind of thinking he took with him into 
office :
... To do so would be to call upon our people for sacrifices which in themselves completely 
alter our way o f life and our political institutions....
Unpleasant as this may be, we may have to face up to the fact that there may be instances 
where violence somewhere in the world on a limited scale is more desirable than the alternatives, 
because those alternatives would be global wars in which we ourselves would be involved, no 
one would win, and in which all humanity would be dragged down.®'*
Two points need further comment here. The first is the warning against 
altering the American way o f life and its political institutions by excesses in 
trying to affect the course o f world events. This warning would be repeated in 
many o f the national security documents o f the Eisenhower period as a 
fundamental reason for not meddling with the economy and trying to preserve 
national security as cheaply as possible.®® The other is that Kennan raises the
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need for awareness that even in an era of American nuclear monopoly, limited 
conflicts will still have to be fought. The question was one o f lines, and where to 
draw them. Kennan called for the maintenance of friendly regimes in areas “at 
least favorable to our continued power and independence o f our nation”, and 
went on to list areas including ;
A. The nations o f the Atlantic community, which include Canada, Greenland and Iceland, 
Scandinavia, the British Isles, western Europe, the Iberian peninsula, Morocco and the 
west coast o f Africa down to the bulge, and the countries o f South America from the 
bulge north;
B. The countries o f the Mediterranean and the Middle East as far east as, and including, 
Iran; and
C. Japan and the Philippines.
The prevention o f hostile governments in these areas Kennan put forward 
as “an irreducible minimum of national security.”®® On the other hand, areas 
outside those mentioned above were to be accorded as not vital to national 
security and, if necessary, given up to the powers o f Communism. Places like 
Japan and the west of Europe were vital industrial sectors of the world, and 
centres of power. Places such as the mainland o f southeast Asia were not.®’ 
Kennan also took care not to place too much influence on ideology when it came 
to national security, as can be seen by his treatment of Communism as a 
complication, rather than as a disease:
Our opposition to Communist expansion is not an absolute factor... I t ... must be taken in 
relation to American security and American objectives. We are ... certainly not always against it 
to the same degree in every area.®®
Kennan was therefore a supporter o f the aid to Turkey and Greece, who 
were having trouble with communist uprisings in 1947, and an early advocate of 
the Far East ‘defensive perimeter’ concept, which called for the defence o f island 
strongholds such as Okinawa, the Philippines and Japan. Commitments on the 
mainland were a different kettle of fish altogether, though. In line with his 
thoughts on keeping intervention limited to prioritised areas, instead of inviting 
every nation “[to start] coming to you with his palm out saying, ‘We have some
194.
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communists - now come across.. .That obviously wouldn’t work.”®”
The original policy of ‘containment’ then, was merely about keeping 
certain important areas of the world out of hostile hands. In keeping with this, 
Kennan refined the concept of perimeter defence from his ‘X ’ article - which 
spoke o f the need “to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at 
every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a 
peaceful and stable world’’”” - to one which Gaddis describes as ‘strongpoinf 
defence.”* This seems to have developed along with the idea that the US was 
taking a ‘calculated risk’ with military force levels in the interests of helping the 
free world recover economically from World War II. What might have been 
taken to mean an unbroken line around Asia by many people was misleading. 
‘Containment’ was originally meant to ensure that rivals to the US, principally 
Russia, could not challenge US allies until they recovered sufficiently to become 
forces to be reckoned with on their own once again; in essence, that they would 
be independent centres o f power allied to the US.”^  It was assumed that, sooner or 
later, once the Soviets realised that the nations surrounding them were leading 
the way in quality of life, they would come to the bargaining table and put their 
suspicions and excesses of totalitarianism to one side. As one White House 
advisor observed, the world had to be convinced “that we have something 
positive and attractive to offer, and not just anti-communism.””® This was the 
reasoning behind the cutbacks in military strength at the same time as the 
Marshall Plan was transferring aid to the war-torn nations of Europe.”'* In his 
‘state o f the union’ address in January 1948, President Truman told Congress 
that, “We are moving toward our goal of world peace in many ways. But the 
most important efforts which we are now taking are those which support world 
economic reconstruction.””®
The problem was that the perception of the threat was very much present to 
the nations immediately next to the Iron Curtain. This was where containment hit 
a snag. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was something Kennan had deep 
reservations about, considering his, and the country’s goal, o f the eventual 
peaceful withdrawal o f both US and USSR forces from the heart of Europe, 
leaving a friendly collection of states, strong enough to be an independent power
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and willing to deal with America.”® As Kennan pointed out :
By asking the Europeans to go in for economic recovery before achieving military 
security, we were in effect asking them to walk a sort o f tightrope and telling them that if  they 
concentrated on their own steps and did not look down in to the chasm o f their own military 
helplessness we thought that there was a good chance that they would arrive safely on the other 
side. And on this basis we made our economic aid available...
[Unfortimately] a lot o f people have been not been able to refrain from looking down.”’
Kennan was disgruntled that the goal of changing the Soviet concept of 
foreign relations was being usurped by the policies originally intended to achieve 
it. Encircling the Soviets with military alliances was not the way to rid them of 
their suspicions about the West! Kennan, as originator o f the policy, noted that 
“what was conceived as an instrument became , little by little, an end in itself. 
What was supposed to become the servant of policy became its determinant 
instead.””®
Another problem was the vastness o f the Asian mainland. By 1949, “The 
Year of Shocks” which rocked the American sense o f security, not only had the 
Soviet Union exploded an atomic weapon, but also the Chinese Civil War had 
resulted in a victory for the ‘Reds’.”” A line of reasoning emerged akin to the 
geopolitical theory of Halford Mackinder’s ‘heartland’, or ‘World Island’.’”” 
Theoretically, if a single communist power could control Eurasia, an “area of 
great potential power which, if  added to the existing strength of the Soviet world 
would enable the latter to become so superior in manpower, resources and 
territory that the prospect of survival for the United States as a free nation would 
be slight.” ’”’
Eight months later the president approved NSC-20/4, which concluded that 
“Soviet domination o f the potential power of Eurasia... would be strategically 
and militarily unacceptable to the United States.’””^  In 1947, Forrestal had said 
that “ as long as we can outproduce the world, can control the sea and can strike 
inland with the atomic bomb, we can assume certain risks otherwise
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unacceptable,” '”® But by 1949 those risks were becoming too unacceptable to be 
left alone. Truman’s eall for a review of national security policy was produced in 
1950, and the Korean War erupted almost right after its completion.
NSC-68 regressed from the ‘strongpoint policy’ of Kennan back to the 
original coneept of ‘perimeter’. There was a eall for a move away from the 
excessive reliance on weapons o f mass destruction as part of the American armed 
response, especially considering the Soviet atomic explosion which shook 
America’s monopoly of the Bomb. There would have to be a more conventional 
build-up because if not, America would have “no better choice than to capitulate 
or precipitate a global war” '”'* which the containment policy was contrived to 
avoid.
In contrast with Kennan’s comparative optimism that the Soviets could be 
‘brought around’, however, NSC-68 took a more ideological stance on the Cold 
War. “The existenee and persistenee of the idea of freedom is a permanent and 
continuous threat to the foundations of the slave society; and it therefore regards 
as intolerable the long continued existence of freedom in the world.” '”® Another 
pessimistic argument was that the Soviets had not tried war yet only because they 
weren’t sure o f winning, and that by 1954, if  the US was still eomparatively 
militarily weak, then it might suffer a surprise attack.*”® Before 1954, though, the 
estimate was that local aggression - ‘war by proxy’- might be the greatest 
danger. “Piecemeal aggression” might be used, the result of which, assuming US 
reluctance to employ its atomic deterrent unless direetly threatened, would be 
might be “a series of gradual withdrawals under pressure until we diseover one 
day that we have sacrificed positions o f vital interest.”*”’ There could be, then, no 
tiers of priority as Kennan had envisioned; rather, “in the context of the present 
polarization o f power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat 
everywhere.” '”® ‘Containment’ was defined as the blocking o f further Soviet 
expansion “by all means short of war”, and also “a retraction o f the Kremlin’s 
control and influence.” '”” Whereas earlier ‘containment’ policies under Truman 
and Marshall had concerned themselves with the aid process as a priority, NSC- 
68 stressed the military as having been left to wither on the vine for too long, 
making the blunt statement that “without superior aggregate military strength, in 
being and readily mobilizable, a policy o f ‘containment’ is no more than a poliey
'”® Gaddis, p. 62.
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ofbluff.” "”
There was also an attempt to justify the extra spending on the military 
economically speaking. The document contained the reasoning that “one of the 
most significant lessons of our World War Two experience was that the 
American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can 
provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while 
simultaneously providing a higher standard o f living.” "* Ways of expanding the 
defence budget came from civilian economic advisors lead by one Leon 
Keyserling, soon to become chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors. He 
would argue that the budgetary ‘pie’ could be expanded if the government would 
increase its ‘management’ of the economy. **** As Gaddis puts it, “to its earlier 
assertion that there should  not be distinctions between peripheral and vital 
interests, NSC-68 had now shown with seductive logic that there need  not be.”"®
One o f the most important statements in the document was one which 
foresaw the application of limited military force in a world where the US no 
longer had a monopoly of nuclear weaponry, and connected it to a phrase 
Eisenhower would later make his own :
“The means to be employed must be proportioned to the extent o f the mischief.” The 
mischief may be a global war or it may be a Soviet campaign for limited objectives. In either 
case we should take no avoidable initiative which would cause it to become a war o f annihilation, 
and if we have the forces to defeat a Soviet drive for limited objectives it may well be to our 
interest not to let it become a global war. ... [Our] capabilities for the application o f force should, 
therefore, within the limits o f  what we can sustain over the long pull be congruent to the range of 
tasks which we may encounter."'*
Importantly for the Eisenhower period, NSC-68 specifically approved the 
decision to build a hydrogen bomb, and rejected out of hand the concept o f “no 
first use”, which might be interpreted by the Soviets as “an admission of great 
weakness and by our allies as a elear indication that we intend to abandon 
them,”**® The nuclear deterrent would continue to be the great guarantor. The 
means being measured to the extent o f the mischief would mean a great deal to 
the services fighting in Korea, though. It would be a war which NSC-68 was 
practically written for; limited in scope, in terms of weaponry used, and in terms
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of territory fought over. It would also be a war ‘by proxy’, fought by a client 
state of the Soviet Union rather than America’s main foe.
The Carrier and Korea
The ‘polarisation’ of the two power blocs, as has been mentioned above, 
had gone too far for the authors o f NSC-68. With the signing o f a treaty between 
Red China and the Soviets in February 1950, alarm bells were ringing in the 
National Security Council. A report in December 1949 used language which 
would be echoed by Eisenhower’s ‘domino-effecf simile later on in 1954 :
“If Southeast Asia also is swept by Communism we shall have suffered a 
major defeat the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the world, 
especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia.**® The 
policy of containment was expanded to the Far East later that month.**’ The 
Navy, still struggling with imposed cuts, had proposals for the defence of Taiwan 
from mainland invasion rejected by the JCS because the United States simply did 
not have enough forces to send there, even though it was o f obvious value as part 
of a ‘strong-poinf defence, let alone the perimeter defence just proposed in the 
Far East.**® As it was now policy to challenge all further communist expansion 
wherever possible, the North Korean invasion o f their Southern neighbours 
meant US involvement.
The Navy was of paramount importance to the US intervention in Korea. 
Carriers aside, re-commissioned surface shipping was vital for supporting US 
troops fighting on the side of the South Koreans ; indeed, for shipping American 
forces over to the island in the first place. As Radford pointed out, 98 out of 
every 100 pounds transported to Korea went by surface shipping.**” After July 5, 
1950, the Navy was directed to blockade the Korean coastline to prevent the 
movement of enemy troops and equipment by sea, and also to restrain hostilities 
in the Formosa Straits, acting as a buffer between Chinese Nationalists and the 
Communists on the mainland.*^”
As for the war itself. When North Korea invaded the South on June 25, 
1950, the US Navy possessed the only forces capable of rapid intervention. Air 
Force jets in Japan were too short-ranged to be very suitable for flyovers of
116 Cited in Baer, p. 318.
**’ Op. Cit.
**® Baer, pp. 318-319, citing Paul Nitze, “The Development o f NSC-68” in International Security 
(Spring 1980), p. 175.
**” Radford Memoirs, p. 232.
*^” Dean C. Allard, “An Era o f Transition, 1945-53”, in Kenneth J. Hagan(ed.), In Peace and War ; 
Interpretations o f American Naval History. 1775-1978 (Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 299.
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Korea, and because of the great speed at which the North Koreans advanced, it 
was impractical to set up extensive land bases for US aircraft on the mainland Y *
th
In July and August, South Korean forces and the US 8 Army sent to bolster 
them were pushed back into the “Pusan perimeter” in the southeast of the 
country. The only carrier available to the US Navy at the time was the USS 
Valley Forge, a Ticonderoga- class carrier of World War II vintage. Her 
aircraft went into action on 3 July, conducting raids on targets around 
Pyongyang, in the North, while the enemy pushed back friendly ground 
forces.*®®The immediate lesson learned was that carrier independence from the 
land was invaluable in a rapidly changing limited war scenario. The aircraft 
launched from US carriers could perform a wider array of operations than Air 
Force jets and land-based heavy bombers, and could react more quickly to 
regional conflicts.* '^* Tactical aircraft became more important than those strategic 
bombers the Air Force was so proud of having procured, especially since Truman 
would not authorise the use o f nuclear weaponry during the conflict. Off the 
coast of Korea, the US Navy operated virtually unopposed, freeing up the carriers 
for more onshore strikes. The carrier was able to provide ideal support for ground 
troops thanks to its ability to remain close at hand. Close-air support, combat air 
patrols and precision strikes on enemy supply lines were missions called for in 
the situation at hand, requiring flexible weaponry, rather than long-range, pre­
planned area bombing which took time to organise. The front lines boomeranged 
up and down the country until the period o f stalemate, after Chinese intervention 
after the first year o f the war. Even then, carrier-based close-air support proved 
more flexible than the Air Force’s due to the more flexible nature o f its 
organisation, as Arleigh Burke revealed :
Army and Air Force close air support relied on a headquarters control system. It wasn’t 
really close air support. ... They just hadn’t been trained to take out enemy troops very close to 
our own positions under the direct control o f the ground officers on the sp o t... who knew what 
the situation was. Naval air - and marine air was so organised and trained ....
Close air support was developed by Marine Corps people and the Navy accepted their 
development absolutely ...
The Army was amazed in [the] Korean War when they found that the Marine Corps were 
getting such very good close air support and they were not.
Isenberg, p. 180.
Baer, p. 318, and see Appendix 2 for more infonnation on Valley Forge.
Isenberg, pp. 182-183.
Op. Cit., p. 337.
Burke, Reminiscences, pp. 490, 686.
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What CNO Sherman noted in his diary in August 1950 after a conversation 
with MacArthur before the Inchon landings seems to back this statement up ;
[MacArthur] praised the Navy and spoke in glowing terms o f its future. ... He ... 
[c]riticised Air Force and blamed them for poor support of troops.*’®
General Maxwell Taylor further commented in 1960 that “Navy leaders 
have viewed with some amusement, I am sure , the unhappiness of the Army in 
its relations to the Air Force, and have tended to say “I told you so” to the Army 
chiefs who struggled so hard for unification to the ultimate detriment o f their role 
in sustained ground combat,” with reference to the two forces’ attempt to wrestle 
naval air away from the navy, and that, “Sinee 1947, the Army has been reliant 
upon the Air Force for tactical air support... and ... has been a dissatisfied 
customer, feeling that the air force has not fully discharged its obligations.”*”
The US carriers were not limited to tactical support roles, however, and 
signs that new carriers could handle a strategic role in the future became evident 
as the war progressed onto its stalemate phase after the Chinese intervention. A 
prime example, in June 1952, saw the Navy taking part in a strategic raid on the 
Suiho electric power-plant complex in North Korea, the largest of which had a 
capacity of 300,000 kilowatts and was supposedly the fourth largest in the 
world.*’® The Navy’s newest AD-4 Skyraider attack bombers were to play an 
important part in the raid, undertaken jointly with the Air Force. The story of the 
raid can be found in James A. Field’s documentation of the war ;
... since damage to Suiho offered a method of making trouble in Manchuria without 
crossing the border, approval from Washington was forthcoming.
... not since the strikes on the Sinuiju bridges in November [1950] had the carrier attack 
planes crossed Korea to hit targets in MIG Alley. The Suiho strike was to be a joint operation in 
which the carrier pilots had the place o f honor... the other attacks were timed to follow it by a 
few minutes.
On 23 June the carrier force began launching 35 ADs with 4,000 and 5,000 pound bomb 
loads for the Suiho attack...
... and then, keeping low to the mountains to avoid radar detection, headed straight for the 
target. Fifty miles fi-om Suiho they were overhauled by 35 F9Fs (jet fighters) which had taken off
*’® Clark G. Reynolds, “Forrest Percival Sherman” in Robert W. Love, Jr., The Chiefs o f Naval 
Operations (US Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 223.
*”  Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trmnnet (Steven and Sons Ltd., 1960), p. 168.
*’® Radford Memoirs, p. 282.
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50 minutes earlier. Eighteen miles from the target the group commenced a clhnb to 10,000 feet, 
with one jet squadron going up to 16,000 feet as combat air patrol. Two miles from the target a 
high speed approach was begun.
The first squadron o f F9Fs dove on the anti-aircraft gun positions on the Korean bank of 
the Yalu river, closely followed by the ADs and the other flak-suppression jets ... Within a space 
o f two and one-half minutes the attacking aircraft delivered 81 tons o f bombs. At the power 
house, which was the main target, red flames filled the windows, secondary explosions were 
reported, and photographs taken by the last ADs to drop showed smoke pouring from the roof.
... No plane was lost, and the only Skyraider to suffer serious damage made a successful wheels- 
up landing at Kimpo Airfield (near Seoul). Everyone else was back aboard ship by dinner time,
... the attack continued ... but - while the Antung field is only 35 miles from Suiho ... no 
enemy MIGs put in an appearance ...
These efforts were followed up the next day by carrier , Air Force and marine attacks on 
all ... complexes. ... Then the picture taking and photo interpretation began, but in North Korea 
and Manchuria the lights had already gone out.
The results appear to have been first class. Something in the neighbourhood o f 90 percent 
o f North Korean power production had been disabled; for two weeks there was an almost 
complete black-out m enemy country; even at the year’s end a power deficit remained.
Obviously, one Essex-class carrier would not be enough to sustain that kind 
of striking power during a war’s course, and the Valley Forge did not fight a 
carrier-air war alone. Sixteen days after the invasion, the JCS voted to stop 
reductions in carrier levels. On 12 July, Defense Secretary Johnson, much 
humbled, promised his CNO, Admiral Forrest Sherman, that “I will give you 
another carrier when you want it.”*®” The Navy’s shipbuilding budget was 
enhanced by the carrier’s performance in Korea, and according to the 
recommendations of the military build-up in NSC-68. The budget approved by 
Navy Secretary Matthews on 30 October, 1950 for Fiscal Year 1952 contained a 
new heavy carrier and two carrier modernisations to help plug the gap made by 
Johnson’s pre-NSC-68 cuts.*®* Throughout the conflict, the Navy had to rely 
extensively on “mothballed” ships and reactivated aircraft left over from World 
War II. During the first year of the war, the Navy expanded by two-thirds to 1100 
ships, and naval aircraft in operation from 4300 to 5400.*®’ In 1950, the carrier 
force had consisted of only seven ships. After changes due to the Korean War,
*’” James A. Field, Jr, US Naval Operations : Korea (Washington DC : Department o f the Navy, 1962), 
pp. 437-439.
*®” Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, p. 256.
*®* Op. Cit.
*®’ Hagan (ed.). In Peace and War , p. 300.
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NSC-68 called for 12 attack carriers to be in service by 1952. Even this goal was 
surpassed, with 16 carriers being in service by the end of that year.*®® In total, 24 
aircraft carriers were recomissioned before the war’s end (or commissioned for 
the first time in the case o f USS Oriskany)F‘^ Carrier and Marine Corps actions at 
places such as Inchon and Hungnam were invaluable to the war effort. So much 
so that, in the words o f George Baer, “naval air and the marine corps played such 
conspicuous and valuable roles that their future as part of the Navy was never 
again challenged, and the conceptual and operational value o f sea power in a 
limited, protracted war was confirmed.”*®® At Inchon, a breathtaking amphibious 
landing was carried out by the marines at the request of General MacArthur. 
Malcolm Cagle and Frank Manson, in their study of the Navy’s involvement in 
the conflict, have said that “history records no more striking example of the 
effectiveness of an amphibious operation.”*®® Soviet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov 
stated in the 1970s th a t , “Thanks to the use of the fleet, the Americans were able 
to create in a narrow portion o f the front a powerful strike grouping o f forces 
enabling them to avoid total defeat in Korea.”*®’ That operation was the spur for 
United Nations forces to outflank and push the North Koreans back to within 
their own borders. After the intervention o f the Chinese, at the end of November 
1950, U.N. forces had to be withdrawn and evacuated at Hungnam in December. 
Approximately 1700 sorties were flown to keep back the advancing Red Chinese, 
and at one point 4 attack carriers, a battleship, 2 cruisers and 22 destroyers were 
providing cover. Had excessive casualties been taken, or the US forces involved 
trapped and destroyed, the war might not have been kept limited. The seas 
offered freedom to depart as well as to invade.*®® The Navy’s 7 Fleet also kept a 
diplomatic function in the limiting o f the war by keeping Chiang Kai-Shek from 
becoming involved.*®”
The Korean War then, strengthened the argument for an interventionist 
maritime policy based on the relatively limited intensity of the war. Although it 
was certainly more than a “police action” by its end, no nuclear weaponry was 
used. Maxwell Taylor wrote to General Matthew Ridgeway after the armistice 
that, “In the end, by a tacitly agreed, mutually cancelling out of special weapons, 
we may be forced to rely again on conventional means.”*'*” Despite the troubles in
*®® Friedman. US Aircraft Carriers, pp. 20-21. 
*®'* Hagan (ed.), In Peace and War , p. 305,
Baer, p. 315.
*®” Malcolm Cagle and Frank Manson, The Sea War in Korea (US Naval Institute Press, 1957), p. 75. 
*®’ S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power o f the State. (Pergamon, 1979), p. 240.
*®® James A. Field, Jr, US Naval Operations : Korea (Washington DC ; Department o f the Navy, 1962), 
pp. 305, 367.
*®” Baer, p. 323.
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the Far East, though, US military planning was still mostly concerned with, “an 
all-out air-atomic, central-front war in Europe,” according to George Baer.*'**
This was nothing new, of course. James L. Lacy criticised the military 
establishment for failing to recognise the fact that “virtually nothing in pre-Korea 
US political strategy had anticipated the kinds of military challenges Korea posed 
became a quickly lost fact.”*'”As far as US forces were concerned, the limits 
were applied by statesmen and not generals, or admirals for that matter. One 
such. Admiral J. J. Clark, is quoted as saying that, “You shouldn’t be in a war if 
you don’t want to win it.”*'*® Matthew Ridgeway, who succeeded MacArthur 
after the latter had campaigned for an escalation to the war, said of pre-war 
planning that “the concept of ‘limited warfare’ never entered our councils.”*'*'* In 
1960, his successor on the JCS, General Maxwell Taylor spoke further on the 
subject when he spoke o f the fact that “many military polemists” found limited 
war a hard fact to swallow, in view of the fact that the US had “an absolute 
monopoly” of nuclear weaponry at the time. “They can only belabor the folly of 
having accepted the conflict on such restricted terms.”*'*®
The reasoning behind keeping the conflict limited was that US policy­
makers still saw the Soviet Union as the main threat and the Red Chinese as a 
diversion - the “junior partners of Soviet Communism” to quote a State 
Department report of June 1950.*'*® In fact, a further document from mid- 
December concluded that war with the Soviet Union was not far away : “[B]y the 
present estimate, for our defense moves we have left to us only days and hours, 
not months and years.”*'*’ A measure o f the preoccupation with the Soviet Union 
was that the greatest single Navy loss during the time of the war occurred in the 
North Atlantic, when the carrier Wasp rammed a minesweeper and sank it for the 
loss of 176 sailors in rough seas off Norway in 1952.*'*® Dean Acheson revealed 
that, “From the very start of hostilities in Korea, President Truman intended to 
fight a limited engagement there. In this determination he had the staunch and 
unwavering support of the State and defense departments and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Such a war policy requires quite as much determination as any other kind. 
It also calls for restraint and fine judgement, a sure sense of how far is enough; it
*'** Baer, p. 320.
*'*’ James L. Lacy, Within Bounds : The N aw  in Post-War American Security Policy (Alexandria : 
Center for Naval Analyses, 1983), p. 145.
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may involve, as it did in Korea, a good deal of frustration.”*'*”
In fact, the days and hours o f 1950 did turn into frustrating months and 
years, thus the US ^vanted to prevent enlargement of the war, which was tying up 
too many resources in such a remote, secondary arena. Europe was the primary 
strategic theatre, and the Soviets the primary foe. Bernard Brodie therefore 
characterised the war after 1950 as “one long story of earnest desire to disengage 
from China.”*®” Omar Bradley, chairman of the JCS, told Congress that war with 
China in 1951 was “the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time.”*®*
It was, however, a good war for the Navy; a war which saw the Navy 
expand its role from the pre-Mahanian task of patrol to that o f offensive power 
projection once again, even if not in the nuclear sense. It started the thinking on 
limited war which would affect the Navy’s policies in the years to come. Floyd 
D. Kennedy put it very succinctly when he said that “a combination o f NSC 68, 
which stated the official case for a reversal in the downward trend in American 
military power, and the Korean War, which accelerated the policies designed to 
fulfill that requirement, shaped the Cold War navy of the 1950s and early 
1960s.”*®’
*'*” Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation : Mv Years in the State Department (W. W. Norton & Co., 
1969), p. 416.
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Chapter Two : ^New Look% New Carriers
While the Korean War revealed the usefulness of the carrier in a peripheral, 
limited engagement, and also showed an example of its continuing ability to 
strike at strategic targets, the US Navy was still clamouring for something more: 
the role that had been denied them with the cancellation of their supercarrier in 
1949. When Johnston told his Chief o f Naval Operations that he could have 
another carrier, a supercarrier was once more on the drawing boards. This was to 
be a pivotal moment for naval-air proponents. The carrier, named after James 
Forrestal, would be the largest ever built, although smaller than the United States 
and significantly redesigned, due to factors of technological advancement which 
shall be detailed in this chapter. First though, there must be an examination of the 
policies of the Eisenhower administration which halted the Korean conflict and 
then fell back on a ‘New Look’ at the ‘containment’ and defence policies of the 
United States.
Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy : A ‘New Look’ or a Step Back ?
As Acheson has said in his State Department memoirs, the Korean War 
was a frustrating experience for the American public and their armed forces. 
‘Jocko’ Clark’s outburst about winning wars was the tip of the iceberg. In the 
Army, a group o f high-ranking officers became known as the ‘Never Again 
Club’, due to their misgivings about fighting wars on the Asian mainland. 
Dwight D. Eisenhower had stated in his campaign of 1952 that if  elected, “I will 
go to Korea”. He was the man who, in the American popular imagination, had 
“put down Hitler”, according to Richard Smoke, and was elected as President in 
November of that year by a landslide majority. Within six months the Korean 
War had been brought to a negotiated armistice.*
Eisenhower’s memoirs are a great help in outlining his thinking on the 
military establishment, which he demanded be structured on the basis of “never 
starting a major war” :
* Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 63-64.
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So long as we were to allow an enemy the initiative, we would have to be capable of 
defeating him even after having sustained the first blow - a blow that would almost certainly be a 
surprise attack and one that would make Pearl Harbor ... look like a skirmish...
The second guideline was that since modem global war would be catastrophic beyond 
belief, America’s military forces must be designed primarily to deter a conflict, even though they 
might be compelled later to fight...
A third was that national security could not be measured in tenns o f military strength 
alone. The relationship, for example, between military and economic strength is intimate and 
indivisible.
A fourth consideration was that our armed forces must be modem, designed to deter or 
wage the type o f war to be expected in the mid-twentieth century. No longer could we avoid the 
folly... o f beginning each war with the weapons o f the last...
The fifth important guideline was that United States security policy should take into 
account the need for membership in a system o f alliances. Since our resources were and are finite, 
we could not supply all the land sea and air forces for the entire free world. The logical role o f  
our allies along the periphery o f the Iron Curtain therefore, would be to provide (with our help ) 
for their own local security ... while the United States, centrally located and strong in productive 
power, provided mobile reserve forces o f all arms.’
Eisenhower’s diaries also provide some excellent insight into the 
formulation of his new administration’s policies, and the opinions o f the Chief 
Executive before and after his election go a long way to explaining and 
summarising his new policies. For example, as early as September 1947, 
Eisenhower had formed strong opinions on the containment policy of the US, and 
where the line of Soviet expansion should be drawn. There seems to be a great 
deal of enthusiasm for a more universal policy of containment :
[Soviet military expansion] is the problem that can only be solved by the maintenance of  
adequate American military strength. We must hew to the line o f principle and be in position to 
sustain our positions. Anything less will mean merely a succession o f new Munichs, finally war 
under conditions least favorable to us.®
As for the Korean War, Eisenhower seems to have agreed with those in the 
armed services who disliked the limited nature of the conflict. Just after the start 
of the war, a visit to the Pentagon produces an opinion that perhaps Eisenhower
’ Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years [2 Vols.h (Heinemann, 1966), vol. 1, p. 446.
® From the papers o f Kevin McCann, Eisenhower aide and speech-writer, in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.). 
The Eisenhower Diaries (W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), p. 143.
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would make more use of nuelear weaponry to avoid stalemate and over­
extension:
They [the anny generals] seemed indecisive, which was natural in view o f  the 
indecisiveness o f political statements. ... It happens I believe weTl have a dozen Koreas soon if  
we don’t take a firm stand, b u t... my whole contention was that an appeal to force cannot, by its 
nature, be a partial one ...
Remember, in a fight we (our side) can never be too strong , we must study every angle to 
be prepared for whatever may happen, even if  it finally came to the use o f an A-bomb (which 
God forbid).'*
Although good for the Navy, the war was something o f an embarrassment 
for the US as a whole. In the words of Radford, “We had tied down in that 
“little” war almost half our army, navy and air forces. We did not look too good 
as a military ally.”® Especially considering the admission that there were bigger 
fish to fry in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the NSC’s primary concerns.
Well before the election results were in, major criticisms from American 
politicians such as Robert A. Taft had surfaced concerning US foreign policy and 
defence preparations. He argued that there was a definite limit “to what a 
government can spend in time of peace and still maintain a free economy...”
[A]n all-out war program in thne o f peace might mean the final and complete destruction 
o f those liberties which it is the very purpose o f the preparation to protect. ...
An unwise and overambitious foreign policy, and particularly the effort to do more than 
we are able to do, is the one thing which might in the end destroy our armies and prove a real 
threat to the libeity o f the people o f the United States.®
Taft was adamant that the US should not meddle with the economic 
liberties which defined American domestic policy for the sake o f the world 
outside. He was not alone in his criticisms. John Foster Dulles, in the State 
Department under the Truman administration before the election of Tke’ and his 
subsequent promotion to Secretary of State’, broke with the administration and 
published his own ideas on American foreign policy in Life magazine in 1952.
Like Taft, he argued against “gigantic expenditures” which were producing 
negligible results.
'* June 30, 1950. Eisenhower Diaries, d p . 175-176. 
® Radford Memoirs, p. 307.
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’ John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment. (Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 120-121.
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Our present negative policies will never end the type o f sustained offensive which Soviet 
Coininunism is mounting; they will never end the peril nor bring relief from the exertions which 
devour our economic, political and moral vitals.
Unlike Taft, Dulles produced an alternative policy which would keep US 
means in line with interests, proposing to use the US nuclear arsenal in a new 
type o f way :
[T]he free world [must] develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly 
against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if  it occurred anywhere, we could, and would 
strike back where it hurts, by means o f our own choosing.
Instead of having nuclear weapons developed for the purposes of an all-out 
war, they would be used as a psychological weapon as well, and at cheaper cost 
to the nation. All-out war with such weapons would be a “catastrophe”, but an 
avoidable one :
If that catastrophe occurs, it will be because we have allowed these new and awesome 
forces to become the ordinary killing tools o f the soldier when in the hands o f the statesman, they 
could serve as effective political weapons in defense o f the peace. ^
The “Boldness” policy sat better with Eisenhower that Taft’s comparative 
isolationism^ hence Dulles’ promotion, and the Eisenhower administration 
aligned its foreign policy around his ideas. Eisenhower was rather more cautious 
about bandying about terms such as ‘retaliatory striking power’. “I’ll be damned 
if I run on that,” he told aides at a Chicago convention.Eisenhow er was 
attempting to strike a ‘middle ground’ with regards to defence expenditure and 
foreign policy. He felt the Truman administration had swung from one extreme 
to another. Writing in his diary in 1952, when still the commanding officer of 
NATO - and thus charged with keeping his political views private - Eisenhower 
felt the need to reiterate to himself the “horns of the dilemma” facing America :
This morning’s paper states that the president’s budget, just submitted to Congress, 
amounts to something over $85 billion with a contemplated deficit for the year o f $14 billion.
® John Foster Dulles, “A Policy o f Boldness”, Life (May, 1952), pp. 146-160, cited in Gaddis, pp. 121- 
122. [italics added]
 ^Gaddis, p. 127.
Cited in Gaddis, p. 128.
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Only in two o f the years o f World War II has an American budget equalled this figure - it is a 
record for peacetime. O f the budget, the paper states that approximately $65 billion is to be 
applied to military preparedness, including help for our allies......
I am very greatly afraid that certain basic truths are being forgotten or ignored in our 
public life today. The first o f these is that a democracy undertakes military preparedness only on 
a defensive, which means a long-tenn basis. We do not attempt to build up to a D-day because, 
having no intention o f our own to attack, we must devise and follow a system that we can carry as 
long as there appears to be a threat in the world capable o f endangering our national safety....
Eisenhower goes on to comment on conversations with James Forrestal, 
wherein the two appear to have agreed that excessive meddling with the civilian 
economy would lead to disastrous consequences. They were trying to defend the 
American way of life, not just property, territory and homes.
As a consequence o f this purpose, everything done to develop a defense against external 
threat, except under conditions readily recognizable as emergency, must be weighed and gauged 
in the light o f probable long-term, internal, effect. For example, we can and do adopt in time o f  
war restrictive practices that, in time o f peace, would constitute serious damage to the system of 
government set up by our Constitution....
This need for avoiding damage to our system markedly influenced Jim [Forrestal ] and me 
as we approached the development o f estimates as to military requirements. No argument is 
necessary to show that excessive expenditures for non-productive items could, in the long run, 
destroy the American economy... At the other extreme, the traditional tendency in our country in 
time o f peace has been to neglect the armed services to the extent o f folly. ...
Now I am afraid that we are risking damage from the other horn of the dilemma - that is , 
the danger o f internal deterioration through the annual expenditure o f unconscionable sums on a 
program of indefinite duration, extending far into the future....
Reasonable men have no recourse except to plan on the basis o f stable, relatively assured 
income and outgo. To do otherwise is adventure far beyond the point o f reason. ...
Only two or three years ago, the president told me very solemnly that an aggregate national 
budget o f more than $42 billion would spell unconscionable inflation in the United States. Today 
we talk about $85 billion and apparently mean it to be indefinitely prolonged into the future .... 
(Ineidentally, I might remark that I am one of those who believe that we did the right thing in 
defying and opposing the communist advance into South Korea. While it is manifestly an 
awkward place in which to fight, and there seems to be no satisfactory conclusion to the struggle, 
yet it is my own opinion that, had we allowed the South Korean republic, which was sponsored 
by the free nations, to go under, we would have by this tune been kicked out o f Southeast Asia 
eompletely, and it would be touch and go as to whether India would still be outside the Iron
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Curtain).
Eisenhower and Dulles were certainly agreed on one thing: the economy 
was paramount. They were not in favour of the economic arguments of 
Keyserling, for example. Although admittedly not an economist, Eisenhower was 
not afraid to openly criticise one, and preferred the language of plain common 
sense to do so. Gaddis quotes him as saying in 1955, “I read... tha t... Mr. 
Keyserling has a plan for spending a good many more billion dollars, for 
reducing taxes, and balancing the budget at the same time. That I would doubt 
was a good economic plan.” ’^  In an official document, Dulles made his feelings 
on the subject very plain as well : “If economic stability goes down the drain, 
everything goes down the drain.
Publicly, the tone was the same. In May 1952, Truman had dismissed fears 
about the country’s economic situation as a “bunch of hooey” ''*, but 
Eisenhower’s view was that excessive defence spending was waste, considering 
the alternative purchases one could make. He expressed this in a speech in April 
1953 :
Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final 
sense, a theft ftom those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed. ,..
We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels o f wheat.
We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 
people.'^
These principles were to be backed up in the budget of that year. 
Eisenhower told his budget director that those same guns, ships and rockets were 
not equivalent to lasting security if the system behind them was failing its people; 
“The most they can do is protect you in what you have for the moment.” "^ He 
directed that savings be made on the defence side o f the budget and a 
corresponding increase be made in other domestie projects. And as was stated in 
the previous chapter, the NSC doeuments o f the ‘New Look’ period also backed 
up this public and official preference for a strong and independent economy as
" January 22, 1952, Eisenhower Diaries, pp. 209-213.
Gaddis, p. 134.
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Eisenhower Speech to American Society o f Newspaper Editors (April 16 1953), cited in Gaddis, pp. 
133-134.
Op. Cit., p. 134.
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the basis for the Eisenhower administration’s America. They take an especially 
sceptical stance on governmental control of the economy, stating a preference of 
avoiding “inflationary borrowing” and “repressive taxation”.N S C - 162/2 called 
instead for “a sound economy based on free private enterprise” as the 
alternative.'* This was in keeping with early containment policy, and with 
Eisenhower’s and Taft’s ideas too. In 1956, another document stressed the need 
to avoid calling upon the people for excessive sacrifices that turn the US into 
“anything resembling a garrison state.” '®
But if having taken away some of the means, Eisenhower proved in his 
inaugural address in January 1953 that he was not an isolationist with respect to 
US interests abroad :
Conceiving the defense o f freedom ... to be one and indivisible, we hold all continents and 
peoples in equal regard and honor. We reject any insinuation that one race or another, one people 
or another, is in any sense inferior or expendable.^"
Using this language, Eisenhower signalled an official intention to keep the 
universality of NSC-68, as well as its ‘perimeter’ containment of communism. It 
was certainly a rejection of the ‘particularism’ of Kennan. Concomitant with the 
speech was the insinuation that no further ‘victories’ for Communism were to be 
allowed. His ‘dominoes’ theory^' was not an isolated incident. “Where in hell can 
you let the Communists chip away anymore ? We just can’t stand it,” he told 
Congress in 1954.^^ It is John Gaddis’ opinion that Dulles believed that instead of 
controlling the American economy, the US might actually have an interest in 
being threatened, if  through that process US citizens could be goaded into doing 
what was necessary to preserve their way of l ife .T h u s  Dulles would quote 
Soviet ideology for this purpose, and Soviet leaders’ own take on the 
advancement of Communism to ‘whip up a storm’, so to speak ;
The Soviet Communists are planning for what they call “an entire historical era,” and we 
should do the same. They seek, through many types o f maneuvers, gradually to divide and 
weaken the free nations by overextending them in their efforts which, as Lenin put it, are “beyond 
their strength, so that they come to practical bankruptcy.” Then, said Lenin, “our victory is
“NSC-162/2” (October 30, 1953), p. 15, in Basic Documents, p. 53.
'* Op. Cit., p. 14.
'® “NSC-5602”(March 15, 1956), p. 17, in Op. Cit., p. 141.
Public Papers o f the Presidents : Dwight D. Eisenhower. 1953 (Eisenhower Papers) (Washington DC 
; G.P.O., 1960), p. 6, cited in Gaddis, p. 129.
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,24assured.” Then, said Stalin, “will be the moment for the decisive blow.’
This was restated for emphasis in Foreign Affairs in 1954.
This is highly ironic, considering the fact that the Soviets ’ proclivity for 
conjuring up external threat was the basis for containment in the first place. 
Dulles was drawing lines on the map, and Eisenhower appears to have gone 
along with this presentation of ‘the Communists’ as scheming, calculating foes. 
In 1954, for example ; “I do say that when [a Communist government] permits 
anything to happen,... it does it deliberately and with a deliberate purpose.” "^ 
Dulles, in 1955, went even further with the domino theory than Eisenhower 
though, placing emphasis on the loss o f islands such as Quemoy and Matsu as the 
beginning of the Communist “objective of driving us out of the western Pacific, 
right back to Hawaii, and even to the United States!” ’^
So what was the New Look, and how would it overcome the imbalance 
which resulted from taking away means from the nation’s armed forces, and 
preserving the nation’s interests abroad?
According to Eisenhower, it was a means of regaining the initiative and 
avoiding more expensive peripheral wars like Korea. “No foreign policy really 
deserves the name if  it is really the reflex action from someone else’s initiative,” 
he announced in May 1953.^* That the Truman-era policies were a series of 
reactions was admitted - more or less - by Truman himself, after his retirai: “The 
Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Pact [sic], the 
mobilisation program and the action by the United States in meeting the 
aggression in Korea were steps dictated by a series of emergencies.” ®^
To avoid this ‘dictation’, if the free world might remain outnumbered in the 
field, it would have to get ‘more bang for the buck’. As early as 1951, 
Eisenhower had been thinking about a cheaper military which was more efficient 
to maintain. He was still thinking in terms of industrial mobilisation as the way to 
counteract massive peacetime spending, too :
I think we should go clear back to methods o f damaging the enemy in any possible war of 
the forseeable future. Then let us examine ways and means o f inflicting that damage. The most
John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution o f Foreign Policy”, Department of State Bulletin (DSBI (January 
25, 1954), p. 107.
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Eisenhower Papers. 1953. p. 265, in Gaddis, p. 146.
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economical and efficient means should be evolved. We might find out just where in the world the 
several kinds o f tactical organizations would be most efficient and thus we might begin to get a 
clear idea o f real efficiency in peacethne organization ...
Industrial mobilization could save our nation (if properly planned for) when our whole 
peacethne military strength might cost us ten tunes as much and largely fa il ... In 1941, our 
peacethne navy took a terrible blow on the first day o f the war, but the navy built after the war 
started did a great job in both oceans, particularly against Japan, where it really, with air force 
help, won the war.*"
“More efficient methods” were eminently possible, as coinciding with the 
New Look were certain technological breakthroughs which eliminated the 
relative scarcity of atomic weaponry, and also allowed a dramatic reduction in 
the size o f atom bombs. The B-47 intercontinental bomber was becoming 
available, and the B-52 was on the drawing boards - a jet which could strike at 
the Soviet Union directly from bases in the United States.*'
Nuclear weaponry then, would be the great equaliser for the US armed 
forces. Eisenhower lost no time in presenting them as once more the great 
weapons of the future for the US, boasting of the American nuclear arsenal in the 
Department of State Bulletin in 1953 :
Today, the United States’ stockpile o f atomic weapons, which, o f course, increases daily, 
exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total o f all bombs and all shells ... o f  
World War II. ...
In size and variety, the development o f atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. The 
development has heen such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status 
within our armed services. In the United States, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the 
Marine Corps are all capable o f putting this weapon to military use.*^
While he later went on to a softer line, expressing a wish to avoid the 
“hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to 
eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world,”** and asking if anyone 
could “wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and 
destruction,”*'* the initial indication of the nuclear weaponry having “virtually 
achieved conventional status” was a sign of the New Look and a slip from the 
‘Statesman Weapon’ ideas o f Dulles. But by no means an isolated slip. In fact.
*" October 18 1951. Eisenhower Diaries, pp. 201-203.
*' see Gaddis, p. 148, and Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, p. 66.
*^  Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Atoms for Peace”, Department o f State Bulletin. Vol. XXIX (December 21, 
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even in 1955 Eisenhower was continuing to compare nuclear weaponry to 
conventional ammunition:
Where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military 
purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or 
anything else.**
This appears to have been more than just a public bluff, though. The top- 
secret national security document NSC-162/2 stipulated that “In the event of 
hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for 
use as other munitions.”*" But what exactly were “hostilities” ? At what level of 
war would they occur, and with what enemies ? The previous paragraph of the 
document mentions the USSR and Communist China, so they may be taken to be 
the targets. “[A]ny aggression by Soviet bloc armed forces” appears to have been 
the trigger for “our political commitment to strike hard back directly against any 
aggressor who attacks [the United States or its allies].”*'^  This was the major 
difference in policy between NSC-68 and the Eisenhower administration. The 
means would no longer be measured to the mischief, but the mischief would be 
attacked at its source. The idea was that, for example, if  Communist China 
decided to attack South Korea, then American retaliation would not be limited to 
the Korean battlefield alone. The plan was “to hit them with everything we[‘ve] 
got” should the armistice be broken, Eisenhower told Congress in 1954.** So the 
primary use of nuclear weapons was to back up threats of what might happen to 
the Soviets if they tried to expand their sphere of influence. As a national security 
document o f 1955 put it, “So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to 
neutralize the US nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect 
them to initiate general war or actions which they believe would ... endanger the 
regime and the security of the USSR.”*® As far as general war went, US nuclear 
retaliation was assured, then. Eisenhower states clearly in his memoirs that, “my 
intention was firm : to launch the Strategic Air Command immediately upon 
trustworthy evidence of an attack on the West.”'*" But when it came to less than 
that - local aggression, for example - then the United States sought to combine 
the certainty o f a response without corresponding certainty as to the nature of that
** Eisenhower papers. 1955 (March 16, 1955), p. 332, in Gaddis, p. 149.
*" “NSC-162/2”, p. 22, in Basic Documents, p. 60.
*" Op. Cit.
** Dwight D. Eisenliower, The White House Years (2 Vols. 1. (Heinemann, 1966), Vol. 1, p. 181. 
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response. Therefore public utterances from such as Dulles had to be unclear 
necessarily. There were times when Eisenhower was seen to be ‘reining him in’, 
for example, at a press conference in March 1954 when the subject of Dulles’ 
“Policy for Security and Peace” article came up. Eisenhower regretted the 
“massive retaliation” implications that many picked up from the speech : “When 
it comes to saying that where on the fringe or the periphery o f our interests ... any 
kind of an act on the part o f an enemy would justify that kind of thing, that I 
wouldn’t hold for a moment ... Foster Dulles, by no stretch of the imagination, 
ever meant to be so specific and exact in stating what we would do.”'*' These 
kinds o f press conferences from Eisenhower were deliberately vague. “Any kind 
of act” wouldn’t demand a nuclear retaliation on the periphery. But perhaps some 
might. NSC 5501 contained the authorisation to use nuclear weapons “even in a 
local situation, if such use will bring the aggression to a swift and positive 
cessation, and if, on a balance of political and military consideration, such use 
will best advance US security interests.”'*^ “Political consideration” meant the 
president’s final authorisation, o f course.
In essence, one of the first NSC documents of the Eisenhower period, NSC- 
149/2, entitled “BASIC NATIONAL SECRUITY POLICIES IN RELATION 
TO THEIR COSTS” summed up the efforts to create the New Look and keep 
costs down at the same time. There were cuts to be made, and the document 
states that in Fiscal Years 1954, 1955, and 1956, expenditures (inflation 
notwithstanding) would amount to $45 billion, levelling off at $40 billion 
thereafter to maintain the readiness required for the ‘long haul.’'** According to 
statistics provided by the US Bureau of the census, national security expenditures 
were, in billions of dollars per financial year, relatively stable under the 
Eisenhower administration, from F Y 1954 to F Y 1961; the lowest expenditure 
being $40.2billion in F Y 1955, and the highest being $47.4 in 1961. One must of 
course allow for inflation with the later expenditures. Revealingly, the same 
source reveals that the percentage o f the budgetary total allocated to defence 
actually consistently fell year to year, from 65.7% in FY 1954, to 48.5% in FY 
1961. There are no drastic falls in the percentage; it falls by from 1% to 2% year 
by year.'*'* This is consistent with Eisenhower’s ideas regarding the stability of 
defence expenditure.
The stamp of Eisenhower’s pre-presidential thinking is clear in the
'*' Eisenhower Papers. 1954 . p. 325, in Gaddis, p. 150.
'*^ “NSC-5501”, p. 12. in Basic Documents, p. 108.
*** “NSC-149/2”, p. 8, in Basic Documents, p. 12.
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document’s continual reference to the combating of inefficiency within the 
armed services. The idea o f ‘more bang for the buck’ is expressed in this kind of 
language within the document, in a section emphasising firepower as opposed to 
manpower :
The guide lines with respect to force levels for the Army and Navy will be to retain for FY 
1954 substantially the combat forces presently in being, with every effort being made to reduce 
overhead resulting from the inefficient utilization o f manpower and at the same time to provide 
substantially increased modernization o f equipment. In the case of the Air Force, substantially 
increased combat effectiveness will be achieved through modernization o f equipment and by an 
important increase in the number o f combat wings...'**
In a diary entry the day after NSC 149/2 was released, Eisenhower reveals 
that “this whole program was explained in the light of the desire of the 
administration to avoid any weakening of our defensive posture in the world; in 
fact, in the light of the need for increasing the presently available strength, 
particularly in the air forces.”'*" In fact, according to Radford, US Navy and Air 
Forces would have to be ready to strike immediately in the case of, for example, 
renewed fighting in Korea, because “all concerned realised that [the armistice] 
would not be the end of a war but merely the cessation of fighting. During an 
armistice our forces would have to remain ready to resume fighting if the enemy 
elected to break it.”'*'' This appears to have been a departure from the more 
marked preference to rely more on mobilisation, but in fact the army would be 
cut by 125,000 men by June 30,1954, and the Navy and Marine Corps by 75,000 
by the same date. The document also refers to the cancelling of any specific D- 
date’ and the establishment o f “a substantial base for full mobilisation in the 
event of all-out war.”'*® It appears then that most of Eisenhower’s original policy 
thinking, born intellectually before his presidency, was more or less consistent 
with the national policies of containment and defence under that presidency. It 
would be unfair, though, to characterise these policies as Maxwell Taylor has, as 
“little more than the old air power dogma set forth in Madison Avenue 
trappings.”'*® Taylor goes on to say that, “it placed emphasis on the new weapons 
o f mass destruction as the basis for providing the retaliatory striking power 
needed as a deterrent to any aggression, large or small.”*" This is also not the
'** “NSC 149/2”, p. 12.
'*" May 1, 1953, Eisenhower Diaries, pp. 235-236.
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whole story, as can be seen by the utterances of Eisenhower. In a conversation 
with Radford, he announced that the US would not preclude itself from 
deploying “a few marine and army units” for one or two “brushfire” wars, but set 
the disclaimer that “if it grew to anything like Korea proportions, the action 
would become one for the use of atomic weapons. Participation in small wars is 
primarily a matter for Navy and Air.”*'
Although the deterrent forces were pushed more to the forefront, there was 
still room in the policy for the express establishment of a mobilisation base to 
compensate for army reductions during peacetime. Indeed, in 1954 he comments 
in his diary that the cabinet “agreed to get on to the matter most urgently in order 
to widen the mobilisation base.”** The shortfall in the meantime would o f course 
rely more heavily on deterrent weapons, which Taylor himself admitted must 
necessarily be the nation’s priority where defence expenditure was concerned 
when he submitted his own ‘National Military Program’ in 1956, the elements of 
which comprised, in order of priority , “deterrence of general war, deterrence of 
local aggression, defeat o f local aggression, and victory in general war conducive 
to a viable peace.”** His point, o f course, was that without a conventional backup, 
Eisenhower’s ‘Munichs’ might come to pass. Eisenhower’s main worry about the 
conventional backup was that it would exhaust the nation’s economy, bankrupt 
the US, and therefore, that way lay defeat. NSC-5501 concluded that to threaten 
war might be the way to stop Soviet aggression. It was recognised that the 
‘Communist bloc’ was “expected to seek constantly ... to extend Communist 
power, and to weaken those forces, especially US power and influence, which 
they regard as inexorable enemies o f their system, However, they will almost 
certainly avoid pursuing their long-term goals in ways which will jeopardise the 
security o f  the regime or their control o f the Communist bloc. ”
The NSC document also went on to list the most probable Soviet objectives 
in order of priority, with the isolation of the US from Eurasia coming after the 
priorities of holding onto the security of the USSR, China, and the Eastern 
European satellites.*'*
Proponents of more conventional arms, Taylor included, have often 
overlooked the fact that the New Look had something of a substitute in mind for 
the lack of a large army to deal with local aggression : the assistance of allies. 
NSC 162/2 argued that the US could not “meet its defense needs, even at
*' “Eisenhower-Radford conversation”, February 1, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, (Whitman File : DDE 
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exorbitant cost, without the support o f allies.”** This line o f thought was backed 
up in the public utterances of Foster Dulles, who in his Foreign Affairs article of 
1954 listed alliances ahead o f the nuclear arsenal as “the cornerstone of security 
for the free nations.”*" Fie emphasised the deterrent value of a community-basis 
for defence under a US ‘umbrella’, which would serve to keep the Soviets and 
Chinese in check.** The aspiration was to contain communism by hemming it 
inside a ring of states aligned with the United States.*® The strategy o f forming 
alliances, though, was not out of step with the Truman administration, which had 
signed formal alliances with 41 countries through the NATO, ANZUS and Rio 
Treaties. As Gaddis notes, “the Eisenhower administration extended defense 
commitments by treaty to only four nations not already covered by alliances 
arranged during the Truman administration,” these being Thailand, Pakistan, 
Korea and Taiwan.*® The policy was to provide technical assistance and to 
intervene only with air and naval forces as far as possible. Asked in 1955 
whether the idea was to have other nationalities bear the brunt of the fighting in 
local situations, Eisenhower replied that “that was the kernel of the whole 
thing.”""
The implications of relying on allies to combat local aggression tied up 
with the universalist foreign policy. The community defence was a two-way 
bargain, and the administration therefore had to be seen to be doing all it could 
for its allies - but doing so without over-committing and risking any escalation. 
Hence, for example, the ‘domino theory’ and Dulles’ fears on Eurasia, backed up 
by statements such as in NSC-5501, wherein, “the Communist Chinese regime ... 
will attempt to expand its power on the mainland of Asia and to expel US power 
and influence therefrom,” and in reference to the offshore islands belonging to 
the Nationalists, “the Chinese Communists will... probably try to seize them, if 
they believe this can be done without bringing on major hostilities with the 
US.”"'
US support of allies therefore had to be credible if they were to be a large 
part of a containment strategy. Hence, Gaddis has commented that, “like the 
authors of NSC-68, Eisenhower and his advisors attached great importance to 
appearances; perceptions o f power, they believed, could be as important as power 
itself. Victories even for independent communism could create the impression of
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a United States in retreat; the resulting loss in morale and will to resist could be 
devastating.”"* Therefore, any straying from the official path was not to be 
tolerated. For example, Eisenhower wrote in 1955 th a t,
On March 10, 1955, after the security council meeting, 1 had the secretary o f defense into 
my office to caution him as to the casual statements he was making in press conferences and 
elsewhere - which sometimes cause very definite embarrassment to the administration. These 
normally involve subjects touching on foreign relations.
The latest... [was] his casual statement that the loss or retention o f Quemoy and the 
Matsus would make little difference in the long run.
While I think that he considers himself a master o f public relations, he seems to have no 
comprehension at all o f what embarrassment such remarks can cause the secretary o f state and 
me in our efforts to keep the tangled international situation ft-om becoming completely 
impossible."*
Therefore, in order to keep allies on side, the US would have to become 
involved in peripheral conflicts, at least to a certain extent. It was therefore in the 
interest of the administration to state the importance o f allies wherever they 
might be located.
As to whether the New Look was a step back, the answer is, at least, not a 
step all the way back to the austerity of the pre- NSC-68 Truman and Johnston 
years. There was much in the new administration’s policies which connected to 
NSC-68, but the main priority was clearly to avoid over-extension and excessive 
military spending. A budget which aspired to be more efficient and eliminate 
duplication was nothing new, but the substitute of firepower for manpower was a 
departure from the previous administration, which led to a more obvious reliance 
on the willingness o f allies to participate in the strategy of containment. The 
overuse of the phrase “Massive Retaliation” has been a major problem in the 
understanding of the New Look. The administration often produced evidence 
that total reliance on nuclear weaponry was out of the question. For example, 
Eisenhower stated quite clearly in 1955 that, “undue reliance on one weapon or 
preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to 
another. We must, therefore, keep in our armed forces balance and flexibility 
adequate for our purposes and objectives.”"'*
The main problem for the likes o f Taylor was one of a lack of clarity as to
"* Gaddis, p. 144.
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when nuclear weapons might be employed, as he criticises the seeming 
vagueness of NSC documents and use of such phrases as “in accordance with the 
national interest.”"* In this he is backed up by historians such as George Baer, 
who states that “The problem for military planners was that it is hard to make up 
a strategy to fit a bluff.”""
The New Look was therefore placing a priority on deterrence. In fact on 
‘maximum deterrence at minimum cost’. There was a loosening of grip on the 
nuclear arsenal, though ; Dulles’ original ideas about them being the weapons of 
the statesman bore fruit as they became weapons of deterrence in peacetime 
rather than just for vague use in a US - Soviet war, as had been assumed during 
the Unification and Strategy hearings of 1949. In fact, according to Radford, US 
Navy and Air Forces would have to be ready to strike immediately in the case of, 
for example, renewed fighting in Korea.
But how did the strike carrier benefit from the new policies ? The answer 
appeared to lie in the limited foreign intervention proposed in the service of 
allies, and the “balance and flexibility” encouraged by Eisenhower so that the 
deterrent weapon need not be used.
The Development of the Forrestal and the Navy’s Mission
Carrier, weapon and aviation technology were to change rapidly throughout 
the New Look era, especially in the 1950s. For example, the Chief o f Naval 
Operations, Arleigh Burke, commented in 1957 that,
There has been a spectacular advance in aircraft design technology. The transition from 
propeller-driven aircraft to jet power has been fast. We are now undergoing another evolution 
from subsonic to supersonic speeds at higher altitudes.
. . .  By modernization we have utilized our assets o f World War II Essex class carriers to 
the maximum. This has been a military necessity in order to maintain an acceptable degree o f  
combat readiness economically in about half the time required for new construction. Carrier 
modernization has been pushed vigorously."*
This all began well before the first Forrestal was launched, in keeping with 
Eisenhower’s desires for a more modern military establishment, but it will be 
seen that the Navy deemed the new supercarrier as absolutely necessary for its
"* Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet. p. 9.
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mission during the New Look era, despite the modernisation that preceded it at 
half the cost o f new construction, as Arleigh Burke reveals above.
Modernisation had been necessary as early as the late 1940s, when 
technological developments were making the Essex class obsolescent. On June 4, 
1947, the Chief o f Naval Operations, approved new aircraft carrier characteristics 
to be incorporated in an improvement program titled Project 27A. This was the 
first o f a series of modernization efforts to modify the Essex carriers to meet 
changing operating requirements. USS Oriskany (CV-34) was the first of the 
Essex class carriers modernized under Project 27A. She entered New York Naval 
Shipyard in October 1947. At spaced intervals, she was followed by Essex (CV- 
9), Wasp (CV-18 ), Kearsage (CV-33), Lake Champlain (CV-39), 
Bennington{CY-20 ), Yorktown (CV-10), Randolph (CV-15), and Hornet (CY- 
12). These programs were conducted at Puget Sound and Newport News, in 
addition to the New York Navy Yard. The Hornet, last to be modernised under 
27 A, left the New York yard in October 1953. The principal changes involved in 
the 27A project were directed toward a capability of operating aircraft of up to 
40,000 pounds gross weight. The H4-1 catapults were removed and H-8’s 
installed, permitting the launching of considerably heavier aircraft than the 
carrier had been capable of during the war years. The flight decks were 
strengthened and the five-inch guns on the flight deck were removed to decrease 
topside weight, to provide more deck space for parking planes, and to increase 
safety aspects of the landing area."®
It was inevitable, then, that the Navy would introduce all-jet squadrons to 
carrier operations. On May 5, 1948, Fighter Squadron 17-A, equipped with 16 
FH-1 Phantoms, became the first carrier-qualified jet squadron in the U.S. Navy.
Project 27A was originally intended for more than nine carriers, but 
development of the steam catapult and the prospective employment of more 
advanced types o f aircraft made it apparent that this project had to be modified to 
meet future needs. Accordingly, Project 27C was initiated. Hancock, Intrepid  and 
Ticonderoga were slated for this program. Most important of the changes were 
the introduction o f the steam catapult developed by the British, and the 
introduction o f the angled (sometimes referred to as axial or canted) deck."®
The trend extended, inevitably, to the Midway class. In September 1953, 
the Navy announced new modernization plans for these carriers under a new 
program called Project 110. In May 1954, the Franklin D. Roosevelt entered 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for the conversion. Midway followed in September
"® Op. Cit.
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1955. These carriers received the best features o f the 27C (angled deck) 
conversion which were incorporated in Project 110. Additionally, they had a 
modified steam catapult installed in the angled deck area. With the changes in 
carrier configuration ran changes reflected in the re-designation of certain 
carriers as they appeared in the Navy Vessels Register. On October 1, 1952, the 
familiar CV and CYB designations went by the board, replaced by the 
designation CYA, reflecting their reclassification as attack carriers. Prior to this, 
only the CYs were known as attack carriers, in the Fleet, distinguishing them 
from the CYB s.*"
Each class of attack carrier could now carry the A3D, a 70,000-pound 
bomber capable of carrying nuclear ordnance, and 30,000 pounds lighter than the 
aircraft proposed for the United States f  Nuclear weaponry had been reduced in 
size, in line with the Navy’s wishes, from the enormous “package” anticipated by 
the designers of the United States to 3600 pounds in weight. So even lighter 
attack planes such as the new A4D Skyhawk were nuclear-capable.** The 
Skyhawk weighed only 22,500 pounds, fiilly loaded, and was ideal for carrying 
‘tactical’ nuclear weaponry for a sea control mission.**
The combination of steam catapult improvements and the angled deck 
made the carriers far more versatile than before, especially considering the new 
mixture o f lighter aircraft and bombs they could carry. A larger island could be 
constructed, for locating multiple radar and communications antennae, and the 
bridge and flight control centre. It was also a suitable place for boiler exhausts. 
And landing aircraft no longer ran the risk of crashing into other planes in the 
forward part o f the flight deck. And thanks to the new catapults, which were 
easier to adapt for heavier aircraft, planes could take off and land simultaneously 
with far less problems.*'*
The problem was that even with modernisation, the older carriers’ life span 
would not last forever :
*" Op. Cit., p. 66.
** Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers , p. 255.
** Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, pp. 255-257, and Friedman, The Postwar Naval Revolution (Naval 
Institute Press, 1986), p. 19.
** John S. Rowe & Samuel L. Morison, Ships and Aircraft o f the US Fleet. 9th Edition, (US Naval 
Institute, 1972), p. 172
74 Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, pp. 263-266.
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“We are limited by how far we can go in modernization programs by the age o f the ship,” 
said Adm. Arleigh Burke in 1957. “They are getting old. Their machinery is wearing out and they 
are becoming progressively more expensive to maintain. Like an old car, they must be replaced...
“The modernization programs have been the proving ground for the advances which have 
been made in carrier operating techniques. But the full combat effectiveness o f these 
developments can be realized only in new construction.”**
Two years earlier, in 1955, USS Forrestal (CVA-59) was commissioned, 
the first of a new class aircraft carrier. Forrestal was launched on December 11, 
1954. The ship was commissioned at Norfolk Shipyard on October 1, 1955. The 
carrier had an overall length o f 1036 feet, a width of 252 feet, and nearly four 
acres of flight deck. She displaced 59,650 tons and had a horsepower rated over 
200,000, and a speed over 30 knots. Four steam catapults were installed. She had 
a complement of 3500 officers and men, including the air group.*"
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Air) James H. Smith, Jr., spoke at the 
commissioning ceremonies:
If our way o f life is to survive, we must maintain these two alternate military postures: the 
first is to maintain a powerful and relatively invulnerable reprisal force which will signal a 
potential enemy to stop, look and listen before he risks an all-out atomic war. The second is to 
insure that we ourselves will not be forced to change the character o f a limited war because of  
fear o f ultimate defeat in a series of them. Fortunately, we need not maintain a completely 
separate set o f forces for each posture. In this ship and the variety of aircraft she can service we 
combine the two, and we add the multiplier o f the ability to appear quickly at any one o f the 
many far-flung trouble spots. This is economy o f force, achieved without sacrifice o f our 
objectives.**
So the new mission of the carrier was actually to be many missions. Heavy 
bombers such as the A3D could conduct long-range nuclear and conventional 
strikes, tactical strikes - again, with either nuclear or conventional weapons - and 
air cover operations too. Whereas the United States had been designed to carry 
only 500,000 gallons of aviation fuel, the Forrestal carried over 1.5 million 
gallons, three times the load of a carrier designed to be larger than the Forrestal. 
The new supercarrier was clearly meant to stay on station for far longer periods
** Scot MacDonald, The Evolution o f Aircraft Carriers. (Office of the Chief o f Naval Operations, 
Department o f the Navy, 1963), p. 68.
*" Op. Cit., and see Appendix 1.
** Op. Cit.
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than its counterpart, hence the extra fuel capacity, and also larger magazines.*®
Finally, the Forrestal wonXà be carrying more protective fighter cover and 
new missile escorts were being developed for the navy too. Thus interception of 
bombers at a distance was a more likely prospect. The Forrestal had only 8 
defensive guns rather than the bristling 44 guns of the United Statesd^
Smith, unknowingly, presaged the Eisenhower administration’s exact 
thoughts, later to be documented in National Security paper NSC 5501, which 
will be examined below. Dan Able Kimball, the Navy Secretary from mid-1951 
to 1953, planned on a campaign to assure the Navy a Forrestal type carrier at the 
rate of one per year over the next 10 years, that figure being arrived at by 
anticipating the need for replacement of the Essexes with newer types of carrier.®" 
In January of 1952, he suggested that some might be atomic powered, following 
on from hearings before the Joint Atomic Energy Committee in September 1951, 
and an interview in an armed forces journal in which he advocated nuclear- 
powered surface craft.®' The Navy secured its second supercarrier before the first 
was launched, the Saratoga being included in the budget for FY 1953, but at the 
cost of an ASW carrier, a destroyer, 2 submarines, 3 landing ships and an escort 
(DE). Kimball was nonplussed about these losses, though :
The importance attached to this carrier [Saratoga] by the Navy Department is emphasized 
by the Navy’s sacrifice o f other combatant ships in the 1953 program in order that a second large 
carrier can be added to the Fleet. Although the ships sacrificed are urgently needed to augment 
the battle readiness o f the Fleet, the Navy decided that the need for the large aircraft carrier is 
even more urgent in tenns o f national security.®*
In emphasising “national security” at the expense of the battle-fleet, 
Kimball appears to have been emphasising the nuclear potential of the carrier, as 
a weapon of deterrence. And the ex-chairman o f the Joint Chiefs o f Staff,
General Bradley, was quoted as saying in 1954 that.
While the main responsibility for strategic bombing must remain with the air force, in my 
opinion the primary mission o f the big carrier is shifting towards strategic air attack. Because the 
enemy doesn’t know where the flat tops are cruising - as he does the location o f airfields - their
*® Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, pp. 396-397.
*® See appendix 1.
®" K. Jack Bauer, “Dan Able Kimball”, in Paolo E. Coletta (ed.), American Secretaries o f the N aw . 
Vol. II (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 833-834.
®' Coletta (ed.), American Secretaries o f the N aw . Vol. II, p. 835, citing “Khnball interview”, Anny- 
Naw-Air Force Journal (15 September 1951).
®* Scot MacDonald, The Evolution o f Aircraft Carriers. (Office o f the Chief o f Naval Operations, 
Department o f the Navy, 1963), p. 71.
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existence is a powerful deterrent to totalitarian aggression.®*
Backing this up, Joel Sokolsky’s assertion is that, “By 1954, American 
aircraft carriers earmarked for SACEUR had begun to shift their primary focus 
from battlefield support to nuclear strike against targets deep in Warsaw Pact 
[sic] territory... ,”®'* the battlefield support role being one advocated by General 
Eisenhower, then Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) for NATO, 
who, fearing for his weak position numerically speaking in Central Europe, 
“placed great emphasis on the sea and air strike assets available to him from the 
flanks... Direct naval support to SACEUR thus became an important role for 
American carriers and, from 1952, nuclear weapons were allocated to this role.”®*
Certainly, an offensive role was foreseen, but would it be primarily a deep 
strike role comparable with the Air Force’s ? Naval and JCS documents must be 
examined to reveal this.
By September 1951, the JCS - with General Bradley still chairman at this 
time - were in agreement that the carrier had a place in offensive operations 
against Russia in the event of a general war, and the attack-at-source strategy was 
being expanded to both flanks of the Soviet Union. A JCS document stated 
clearly the carrier’s offensive role :
These [carrier] forces represent the major striking power o f the Navy and are primarily 
responsible for neutralising at the source the enemy’s offensive capabilities to threaten control o f  
the seas. These forces will destroy enemy naval forces and shipping, attack naval bases, attack 
airfields threatening control o f the seas, support amphibious forces and support the mining 
offensive. As additional tasks, the carrier striking forces will defend bases and vital areas against 
attack through the seas as required... In addition to the above, these forces will provide naval 
support essential to the conduct o f operations by [SACEUR], the Commander in Chief, Far East 
(CINCFE) and other area coimnanders. For example, the 6 Fleet, now in the Mediterranean, will 
provide naval support to SACEUR in the accomplishment o f his missions. ®"
The defensive role was therefore to be given second priority to that of sea
®* “The Role o f Aircraft Carriers”, Paper bv the British First Lord o f the Admiralty. ADM 1/24695, (9 
November 1958), cited in Eric Grove & Geoffrey Till, “Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the Era 
o f Massive Retaliation”, in John B. Hattendorff and Robert S. Jordan (eds.) Maritime Strategy and the 
Balance o f Power (St. Martin’s Press, 1989), pp. 271-303.
®'* Joel J. Sokolsky, Seapower in the Nuclear Age : NATO as a Maritime Alliance. (Harvard University, 
1984), p. 126, cited in Hattendorff & Jordan (eds.). Maritime Strategy and the Balance o f  Power , p. 
290.
®* Hattendorff & Jordan (eds.), Maritime Strategy and the Balance o f Power , p. 286, citing Sokolsky, 
pp. 65, 68-69.
®" “JCS 1800/166” (September 7, 1951), cited in David Alan Rosenberg, “American Post-war Air 
Doctrine and Organisation: The Navy Experience”, in A. P. Hurley and R. C. Ehrhart (eds.), Air Power 
and Warfare. (Washington DC: Department o f Air Force History, 1979), p. 265. [italics added]
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control by offensive means. Eisenhower himself, had told Truman that he wanted 
a “great combination of air and sea strength” on both of his flanks, “to hit [the 
Russians] awfully hard.”**
Thus the focus for carrier-air strikes seemed destined to remain rooted to 
over-the-shore missions. Bearing in mind that the flexibility of the carriers was 
very much on the minds of Naval planners at the time, the carriers were in fact 
being configured for missions supporting sea control, and general war battlefield 
support, but also lower-intensity, diplomatic roles. The Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations stated in 1950 two important roles for the Navy on either end of the 
spectrum, both of which could be fulfilled by the carrier. The first, and most 
important, was sea control;
Exercising control o f all the seas, as we must, is going to be a mammoth task. Note that I 
say exercise control. To do this we must have the control from the beginning, not fight for it for 
four long years as we did in the Pacific in World War II...
but there has always been, and now exists to an important degree, a peacetime task which 
only the navy can perform, namely that which is broadly termed “showing the flag.” A naval 
force is the only one which can move at will throughout the world without violating the neutrality 
or sovereignty o f another nation. The navy is thus an important tool o f diplomacy.**
By October 1951, the same officer, now CINGLANT (Commander-in- 
Chief, Atlantic Fleet), was pushing the battlefield support role endorsed by the 
JCS the month before, as the "augmentation and support of forces in Europe..."
Within the confines o f this task, the Atlantic Command exhibits its definite offensive 
potentiality. By this arrow, we indicate our readiness to deploy striking forces to the forward area. 
They would most probably be fast carrier task forces aimed at operations along the Western 
European coast or against some o f the northern islands such as Spitzbergen...
...[T]he United States has maintained a naval force in the Mediterranean since the end of  
the last war. We call it the Sixth Fleet, and it necessarily looms large in our European strategy.
This force, in conjunction with those o f our allies, by maintaining control o f the 
Mediterranean, would furnish security to General Eisenhower's right flank.*®
** David Alan Rosenberg, “American Post-war Air Doctrine and Organisation; The Navy Experience”, 
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There were two main problems with carrier forward operations in the early 
1950s, though. The first was the weather in rough arctic seas. In 1952, the first 
NATO Atlantic exercise - 'Mainbrace' - was held, with four US Fleet carriers 
participating (including two Midway CVBs).®" They simulated tasks of 
interdiction and destruction o f enemy forces in Norway, air support for ground 
forces in Norway, and support for NATO ground forces in Denmark, too. There 
was also the task o f covering a convoy to Bergen. But operating in Arctic waters 
caused all kinds of difficulties, as was indicated by the Wasp incident detailed in 
Chapter 1. According to Grove and Till, the weather was responsible for reducing 
the level of carrier-based air activity by 80%.®' In 1953, the weather proved even 
more of a setback during 'Mariner'. The carriers were unable to mount their 
attacks, so unstable were they as platforms in the rough seas. This was a sharp 
jolt to any confidence about the World War II vintage carriers' ability to take on 
Soviet land-based aircraft on NATO's northern flank.®* The near fiascos of these 
two exercises would, though, supposedly be less of a problem for the 
supercarrier, which would be more stable, thanks to its greater size, and less 
emphasis on the armoured flight deck of the CVBs, which resulted in more top­
heaviness and roll.®*
The other main problem, of course, was the very ample sea denial force 
that the Soviets could put to sea and air. Soviet land-based air was becoming 
more and more long-ranged, and the submarine force, "mainly for home-water 
control" at this time, according to Baer, was beginning to be equipped with 
guided missiles by mid-1950, with 70 boats out of a total o f 261 being so 
equipped.®'*
Before 1955 then, the Navy was sounding the alarm on a renewed anti­
submarine threat, against which it set a three-track strategy. One track was the 
defensive use of antisubmarine carriers. Half the carrier force was converted to 
ASW configuration, mostly old Essex class carriers. The second approach was 
one that would survive for decades: an undersea barrier composed of passive 
hydrophones and an attack submarine force to back up detection with 
destruction.®*
D. McConnack, cited in Gray & Barnett (eds.), Seapower and Strategy, pp. 330-331.
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The third approach is the one this dissertation is coneerned with : the air 
strikes at the nests themselves; the sea-control rationale for an air-atomic general 
war carrier force. A Navy planning document of 1951 stated that, "The most 
effective and economical means of destroying threats to our control of the seas is 
to destroy these threats at the source," this being achieved by use of the carrier 
task forces to "destroy enemy naval forces and shipping, attack naval bases, 
attack airfields threatening control of the seas..." and so on, word for word with 
the JCS proposal of September that year.®" Amid the talk o f attack-at-source, 
navy documents gave little attention to limited war until the mid-1950s. Even 
Arleigh Burke's Strategic Plans Division in 1952, although still concentrating on 
sea control, thought in terms of war with the Soviets. They did however, 
anticipate the New Look strategy of support of forces, notably US allies overseas, 
in their strategic priorities:
1, Supply and support [of] US forces deployed overseas
2, Supply and support [of] US allies, in support o f treaty commitments
3, Deny use o f the Seas by the Soviet Union to further its objectives or interfere with ours
4, Import the raw materials and coimnodities necessary to sustain US armed forces and the 
US war effort. 97
This was a list of Navy tasks, which, although thinking in terms o f global, 
general war, anticipated it in terms of a nuclear exchange being inconclusive and 
indecisive. Burke himself, in his Reminiscences, argues why :
The Soviet Union is a vast country. It is also a closed society, and therefore can do things 
secretly, including building large manufacturing plants and military installations, while we 
cannot... The probability o f the United States being able to... destroy the will and capability of the 
Soviets to continue the war, we [the Navy planners] thought was very slight and that it would be 
foolhardy to depend on that alone. ®*
The "supply and support" of US allies referred to NATO as well as other 
regions, reflecting British Admiralty concerns about the safe and timely arrival of 
convoys as part of the NATO's maritime alliance dimension.®® Op-30 seems to 
have made little headway here, though, against a tide which had been rising for
®" Department o f the Navy, Naval Research Advisory Committee, Report on Historical Perspectives in 
Long-range Planning in the N aw  (Washington DC: Office o f the Assistant Secretary o f the Navy - 
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some time. The Air Warfare Division of the Deputy CNO (Air) was specific 
about retaining a primarily offensive force :
Carrier Aviation must retain the bulk o f its strength in offensive power if  it is to support a 
truly offensive Navy rather than a defensive one. Our Navy must carry out numerous functions 
other than defensive antisubmarine warfare and must possess the self-contained ability to move at 
will and wage offensive war against the enemy in the air, on the surface and below the surface.
This then, was the kind o f theory the Navy had at the start o f the New Look 
era. The Navy had its atomic role and the supercarriers were on their way to 
support it more fully. Thus the Navy was already in possession o f the modern, 
nuclear-capable weaponry demanded by the New Look at the outset. But Dulles 
had, as mentioned previously, hinted that nuclear weaponry would be the 
"statesman's" weapon, as opposed to the use of it as a normal tactical weapon as 
proposed by Eisenhower. The administration might be ambiguous as to nuclear 
use, and just as under Truman, the new president would have the final say on its 
use.
The Navy, under new CNO Robert Carney (August 1953 - August 1955) 
came up with a solution, though; one which had been arrived at already by Dan 
Kimball in 1952. The strike carrier force was basically versatile enough, thanks 
to the development of lightweight nuclear weapons and both long-range and 
tactical attack aircraft, to 'hedge its strategic bets', so to speak. In December 1953 
and January 1954, Carney forwarded studies by Strategic Plans (Op-30) to the 
JCS which argued that the carriers were a highly mobile, combat-ready strategic 
reserve which could "continue over the long term to be ready to cope with 
limited aggression and at the same time be prepared for general war." With 
reference to general war, the Navy carriers were capable o f inflicting "massive 
damage", as well as providing tactical support and sea control.*"' This was an 
argument for inland strikes against strategic targets, then. One made possible by 
the new Forrestals, and the new squadrons of heavy attack aircraft introduced 
during the New Look era, the 2000-mile ranged AJ Savages, and later the 3000- 
mile A3D Skywarriors and supersonic A5 Vigilantes. That meant, for example, 
that a US carrier in the eastern Mediterranean was within striking distance of 
such strategic targets as the oil refineries at Baku, military-industrial targets in
'"" David Alan Rosenberg, “Aineriean Post-war Air Doctrine and Organisation: The Navy Experience”, 
in A. P. Hurley and R. C. Ehrhart (eds.). Air Power and Warfare. (Washington DC: Department o f Air 
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Stalingrad and Kharkov, and the Black Sea naval facilities were possible targets 
for the attack-at-source role.'"* The Forrestal and her ilk embarked a full 
squadron of twelve o f these heavy bombers, Midways an abbreviated squadron of 
nine, while modernised Essex CVAs carried only three.'"* It is an important point 
to note, however, that the effort was made to put them on all classes of CVA, in 
the spirit of versatility. And each class of carrier could carry three 12-aircraft 
squadrons of smaller attack craft, all of which could deliver the new smaller 
"tactical" weapons.'"'*
Essentially, though, the carrier had to fulfil its sea control function first, 
before there was any chance of a strategic strike into inland targets. A 1954 Op- 
30 document from Burke spelt out the status of the Navy's wartime priorities, 
which were remarkably similar to pre-New Look tasks :
First, the navy must dominate the seas to maintain the flow o f men and materials to 
theaters o f war, and the return flow o f our supply o f strategic raw materials. It must be prepared 
to counter the probable capabilities o f the enemy to challenge our control o f the seas and 
especially the sea areas ... used by our shipping. We must deny our most probable enemy the use 
of his submarines, and his growing fleet o f surfaee ships, and must counter his mining effort and 
his air threat to shipping and naval forces.
Second, the navy must land combat forces where and when they are required, and assist in 
providing combat support to US and Allied forces, including air and gunfire support, as the 
situation may require. Proteetion o f the sea flanks of our overseas forces against enemy forces 
which attempt to interfere with naval operations, shipping or naval support o f our ground forces 
is an important navy responsibility.
Third, the navy must, by offensive operations, control the sea areas that the enemy wishes 
to use, denying him the use o f these seas and permitting their use by our own naval forces, as 
avenues into enemy territory. '"*
As applied to the offensive carrier force, the priority tasks are quite clear. 
First, the sea control function of attack at the source should be used to make sure 
control o f the seas is assured, ahead of any other mission. Second, air support for 
the flanks, and the quashing of any other threats to US and allied forces operating 
on those flanks. Then, and only then, should the US carrier force be used as an
Baer, p. 347.
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“avenue into enemy territory” for inland strategic strikes. The emphasis on sea 
control, then, is constantly present in navy strategic documentation from the early 
to mid-50s, both before and after the New Look era. The navy's strategic 
planners, although thankful to be part of the US strategic posture thanks to fleet 
modernisation and the possession o f a nuclear-capable force, which could be 
stationed around the world in accordance with Eisenhower's wish for a ready 
reserve, stressed the forward operation of carriers in constant connection to its 
sea control function where a sea-denial force was present. An American naval 
strategic force was present, but could only strike non-naval targets after it was 
first assured of its own defence.
This handicap was to change with a new approach to Naval strategic power 
: the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which would 'cut out 
the middle man' of sea control by virtue of its undersea relative invisibility.
The Attack Carrier 'versus' Polaris
It is important to note that there can be no in-depth discussion of Polaris 
development here. This section will instead concentrate on the priority given to 
Polaris and the effect on the attack carrier, leading to future strategic implications 
under the leadership of Arleigh Burke (CNO from August 1955-1961), in the 
next chapter.
The first real guidelines for future naval strategy and appropriations in the 
light of Soviet possession of a hydrogen weapon came out just months before his 
entry into office, with a pivotal NSC document in January 1955 entitled NSC 
5501, closely followed by the 'Killian Report' o f 1955, entitled "Meeting the 
threat of Surprise Attack."'""
NSC 5501 stressed that the US military should be divided into different 
elements; the first o f which should be an effective 'second-strike' nuclear 
retaliatory power, "secure from  neutralization or from  a Soviet knockout blow, 
even by surprise..."
So long as the Soviets are uncertain o f their ability to neutralize [this]... there is little 
reason to expect them to initiate general war.
Again, the US nuclear force was stressed as a peacetime deterrent. The
106 Technological Capabilities Panel [Killian Commission] in Trachtenberg, Basic Documents, pp. 321- 
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second element was consistent with New Look planning, and with Eisenhower's 
state of the union address o f that year : forces sufficient to "help deter any resort 
to local aggression, or,
... to punish swiftly and severely any such local aggression, in a manner and scale best 
calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into nuclear war. Such ready forces will be in 
addition to those assigned to NATO; they must be properly balanced, sufficiently versatile, 
suitably deployed, highly mobile and equipped as appropriate with atomic capability.
It seems clear enough that the Navy's attack carriers fit the bill of 
versatility, mobility and atomic capability by 1955, but, importantly, doubts had 
been raised about the carrier's vulnerability in the North Atlantic. Under Burke, 
the navy would look elsewhere for a secure strategic striking force. The Killian 
Report, following up NSC 5501, argued that the US should develop, quickly, a 
medium-ranged ballistic missile (IRBM), and concluded that "ship basing 
probably would allow better coverage o f Soviet Bloc targets [than land-basing] 
and be free of political restraints [i.e. a lack o f need for a foreign power's 
permission for basing]." Burke was aware of opposition to the IRBM 
development, but established in December 1955 a "Special Projects Office" 
under Admiral William Raborn to garner the best people in the Navy for the job. 
His biographer described the decision to push for Polaris as "probably the single 
most significant action of his six years as Chief of Naval Operations.""" On the 
other side of the coin, Polaris development ate up more and more of the Navy's 
budget : over 4% by FY 1958, 8.96% by FY 1960, and 14.06% in FY 1961.’" 
The corresponding shift in resources would cut deeply into the fleet to the extent 
o f cancellation o f new ships, submarines and weapons systems such as the 
Regulus and Triton eruise missiles, causing sea control proponents such as Elmo 
Zumwalt Jr. to bemoan the decision as "the single worst decision about weapons 
made during my years of service ... without cruise missiles practieally all our 
long-range offensive capability was crowded onto the decks of a few carriers.""*
In the words of Harvey Sapolsky, "the choice among weapons systems is 
the choice among defense strategies.""* This was certainly true. NSC documents
’"* Op. Cit.
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outlined the national strategy, and Polaris certainly supported nuclear retaliation 
on a strategic scale, whereas the cruise missiles were intended for sea control 
targets such as naval airfields, bases and shipyards. As CNO then, Burke in 
effect began a 'split' o f naval functions into the two distinct elements of 
retaliation by Polaris, and the more flexible carrier force. According to 
Rosenberg's account though, Polaris was for use by both submarine and  surface 
forces. The carrier forces were of course, already nuclear-capable, but missile 
stationing for task forces was one way to ensure continued appropriations for 
new carriers and cruisers, within the strategic forces.
Instead of continentally-based ballistic missiles, then, Burke proposed that 
Polaris be based on surface ships, which were more mobile than SAC bases or 
land-based s i l o s . I n  June 1959, he asked the JCS to approve Polaris for basing 
on the navy's six guided missile cruisers - eight missiles per ship. As well as the 
carriers, the escorting cruisers could help bridge the shortfall in Polaris 
deployment until the undersea missile fleet was complete, whilst simultaneously 
carrying out other missions. The decision was made, though, to save them for the 
submarines. Neither Defense Secretary McElroy nor the other chiefs were 
convinced about the cruiser's ability to perform the task, especially considering 
the requirement for carrier escort."^
Intriguingly though, Harvey Sapolsky puts forward an interesting 
counterpoint, lauding Polaris as "the beneficiary of a rather rare convergence 
between a policy consensus and technological opportunity.""®
He sees the Polaris project under the SPO as a ram-rodding of a priority 
project through Naval opposition, which was sizable in the face o f its enormous 
cost : "The entire increment in the navy budget from 1955-1961, a total of 4.5 
billion dollars.
His opinion is that internal threats to the program came from officers keen 
to avoid another direct competition with the Air Force so soon after the navy 
debacle in the B-36 hearings of 1949.*^° He describes a strategy o f "co-optation" 
as a means of unifying the Navy on Polaris development : getting people behind 
the project by promising them a slice of it; people such as surface ship and carrier
Rosenberg, "Burke", in Robert W. Love Jr. (ed.). The Chiefs of Naval Operations (U.S. Naval 
Institute Press, 1980), p. 277.
Op. Cit., p. 281.
Op. Cit., p. 294.
""Op. Cit., pp. 301-302.
"® Harvey Sapolsky, "Technological Innovators : Admirals Rabom and Rickover", in Arnold R. 
Shapack (ed.). Naval History Svmposimn - The N aw  in an Era of Change and Crisis. (U.S. Naval 
Academy, 1973), p. 26.
"'"Op. Cit., p. 27.
Op. Cit., p. 28.
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proponents :
...[TJhere were a lot o f proposals circulating in the Navy for putting Polarises on aircraft 
carriers and strapping them on ... cruisers. The Polaris proponents would, in turn, endorse every 
one o f these proposals, even though they knew them to be technologically absurd or perhaps ... 
didn't seem to be strategically possible. They did so because they were interested in getting the 
support o f the carrier admirals ... who were interested in building more carriers. ... And it was a 
wise policy to go around endorsing such proposals, because the Polaris proponents knew they 
would never see the light o f day when it came time for ftmding; the proposals could be secretly 
sunk at the Office o f the Secretary o f Defense lev e l... and it was cost free.
Rather interestingly, this argument was part of a paper delivered at a naval 
history symposium which a retired Burke himself attended and where he also 
gave a paper; yet there is no record o f any comments to the contrary from the ex- 
CNO. Not only that, but the viewpoint is backed up by Raborn's early insistence 
that the Polaris missile was part of a sea control function that would support a 
carrier-based strategy :
Its tactical mission would be to beat down fixed base air and missile defenses to pave the 
way for carrier strikes aimed at destroying mobile or concealed primary targets."
But there was no hiding its real purpose by 1957, when the Naval Warfare 
Analysis Group had the Polaris mission down as national deterrence, 
programmed to hit "population or industrial targets," due to the relative 
inaccuracy of the missile versus hardened military emplacements. In short, 
with the advent of Polaris, carrier-air operations under Burke - using the NSC as 
his strategic guide - would have less of a strategic mission. This was part of his 
eventual intention to relocate them to a mission of intervention, a limited-war 
role. This would cause controversy within the administration and mean a troubled 
future for the strike carrier, with its original "national security" mission usurped 
by the Polaris SLBM.
Op. Cit., p. 31.
Baer, p. 355, citiug the Naval Research Advisory Coimnittee, Historical Perspectives, pp. 48-49; 
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Chapter Three : The Strike Carrier and Limited War
All throughout the New Look period, strike carriers were ‘deployed 
forward’ to trouble-spots around the world, for reasons which James Cable refers 
to as ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’/  Showing the flag, forcing an opponent to back 
down, sometimes getting involved in a conflict. This chapter details more exactly 
the carrier’s role in situations outside the scope of a full-scale war.
The first section will deal with two contemporary approaches to the 
problem of limited war after Korea. The first was the government stance of 
‘graduated deterrenee’, whereby the ‘New Look’ reliance on nuclear weapons 
was hindered by the approaching nuclear balance with the Soviet Union, and new 
attention was brought to ‘tactical’ nuclear warheads for the purposes o f fighting 
peripheral wars.
Critics of the government’s continued reliance on non-eonventional forces 
include Bernard Brodie, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and General Maxwell Taylor. 
Their differing approaches, especially in the case of the two servicemen (Brodie 
being more o f a theorist) might be put under the umbrella of an alternative 
approach to fighting limited wars or ‘countering local aggression’ : Flexible 
Response - a build-up o f arms and men in a similar style of proposal to that 
propounded in NSC-68. In the case of the Navy, this was ‘The Navy of the 1970- 
Era’, the central question being how much disagreement there was between the 
administration and the Navy leadership?
The next section will deal with the actual situations the Navy’s carriers 
found themselves in around the globe. Indochina, the Quemoy-Matsu and Tachen 
Islands crises, and Lebanon all serve as case studies for the role of the carrier. 
Whereas previous sections have asked the question of what the earriers’ role 
should be, this section examines what it actually was at the time.
The final section is an examination of the debate between the 
administration and the Navy’s leaders as to the future role of the carrier and what 
force levels were required to allow it to perform that role. A central issue is that 
of the cost of the new nuclear carriers, of which the Enterprise was the first. Was 
nuclear propulsion necessary, or should the priority have been more oil-fired 
carriers, especially in a period when the Navy was beginning to age as a whole? 
And if the main role o f the carrier was to be that of limited war, did it follow that
* see James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy. 1919-1979. (Macmillan Press, 1981)
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they could be smaller or cheaper ? This is an examination of the balance 
between defence economy and the composition of fleet required for a limited war 
role.
Limited War Theory : Graduated Deterrence and Flexible Response
On January 23, 1956, Eisenhower commented on a staff report headed by 
General Harold L. George, on the "net evaluation of the damage that would be 
anticipated" in a thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union, if that war were to 
start on July 1 o f that year. It was a two part report ; the first part anticipating no 
warning as to the attack until detection o f its launch, the second anticipating "a 
month of strategic warning." The report coneluded in the first case that the US 
would sustain some 65% casualties among the population. The limiting factor on 
the damage inflicted being "not so much our own defensive arrangements as the 
limitations on the Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons." More optimistically, it 
was estimated that Russia would be obliterated by the American response, but in 
the second case of a month's warning before launch, there was "no significant 
difference in the losses we would take." ^
With the advent of both blocs being capable of sufficient thermonuclear 
and atomic capability, concluded Bernard Brodie in 1959, there came an end to 
the days where "a real - and difficult - analytical problem [existed] in choosing 
targets that would make a campaign decisive rather than merely hurtful... [and] 
the functions of ground and naval forces, though clearly and markedly affected 
[by fission weapons], still appeared vital."® With the coming of a deployable 
hydrogen bomb force in Russian as well as American hands, and the US working 
on a second-strike capability, there appeared to be a nuclear stalemate developing 
in the late 1950s. The idea o f nuclear weapon use in a wide range of 
circumstances began to elieit wide criticism. As John Lewis Gaddis asked, "what 
assurance was there that the US would actually reach into its nuclear arsenal for 
the means to counter every outward probe the other side launched, however 
insignificant?'"* On a more contemporary basis, Henry Kissinger argued that it 
was unwise to combine "maximum horror and maximum uneertainty,"
 ^ "January 23,1956", Eisenhower Diary (DDE Diaries series. Box 9, Diaiy-Copies o f Personal [1955- 
1956], in Eisenhower Diaries , pp. 311-312.
® Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age. (Princeton Uniyersity Press, 1959), p. 153.
'* Gaddis, p. 165.
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The greater the power, the greater the inhibitions against using it except in the most dire 
emergencies, and the more likely that no objective will seem important enough... ^
NSC 5602, written at the start of February 1956, watered down the 
language of nuclear weapon use from previous documents such as NSC 5501's 
confident proposal that US forces should "punish swiftly and severely any such 
local aggression."® Instead, the language used in 1956 was that the US "ready" 
forces should,
Defeat or hold  in conjunction with indigenous allies, any such local aggression, ... Such 
ready forces must be sufficiently versatile to use both conventional and nuclear weapons ... Such 
forces must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to 
intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear 
weapons. "
The document recognised that "with the coming of nuclear parity, the 
ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly 
important," and with regard to the allies so important to the US containment 
policy, "the apprehensions of US allies as to using nuclear weapons to counter 
local aggression can be lessened if the US deterrent force is not solely dependent 
on such weapons." It concluded though, that when confronted with a choice 
between "acquiescing in Communist aggression or... taking measures risking 
either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to 
take these risks if  necessary." ®
Therefore the administration was still, if not wholly, reliant to a certain 
extent upon nuclear weapons and the concomitant risks of escalation without 
what had been termed 'escalation dominance'. Eisenhower himself was still trying 
to convince critics within the military that tactical nuclear weapons would not 
lead to all-out war: "The tactical use o f atomic weapons against military targets 
would be no more likely to trigger off a big war than the use o f twenty-ton 
’blockbusters'," he said to Maxwell Taylor in 1956. *
With regard to any conflict in the European area, even with regard to 
Maxwell Taylor's criticism of a probable "limited" engagement between East and
Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. (Harper, 1957), p. 152.
® "NSC 5501", p. 11, in Basic Documents . p. 107.
" "NSC 5602", (February 6, 1956) p. 5, in Basic Documents, p. 129. [italics added]
® "NSC 5602", pp. 5-6, in Basic Documents . pp. 129-130.
 ^ "Eisenhower conversation with Maxwell Taylor", May 24, 1956, Eisenhower Papers (Whitman File : 
DDE Diary, Box 8, "May 56 Goodpaster", cited in Gaddis, p. 167. [italics added]
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West over Berlin*®, Eisenhower was most specific: "If resort to arms should 
become necessary, our troops in Berlin would be quickly overrun, and the 
conflict would almost inevitably be global war. For this type of war our nuclear 
forces were more than adequate.” **In other words, NSC 5602 still held true. The 
choice was nuclear deployment over Soviet expansion. As late as 1960, when 
Taylor's criticisms came out in print, NSC documentation made it absolutely 
clear that "conflicts occurring in the NATO area, or elsewhere involving sizable 
forces  ... should not be construed as local aggression."*^ Thus nuclear forces 
would be used, should deterrence fail in the face of large-scale enemy forces. 
'Local aggression', o f course, had been defined by Eisenhower in 1956 as 
conflicts below “Korea proportions”, as was detailed in chapter 2.
The sticky point was how and where nuclear weaponry could be used in 
limited wars, in order that those wars might be kept limited. NSC documents 
stated time and again that local aggression should be dealt with "in a manner and 
on a scale best suited to avoid the hostilities broadening into total nuclear war."*® 
The NSC recognised that "general war might occur as the climax of a series of 
actions and counteractions which neither side originally intended to lead to 
general war", and that, "an increasing dependence on nuclear weapons may 
impair US ability to intervene against local aggression without the use of such 
weapons." *^* This concern was mirrored by Kissinger the next year. He argued 
that "the limitation of war is established not only by our intentions but also by the 
manner in which the other side interprets them. Unless some concept of 
limitation of warfare is established in advance, miscalculation and 
misinterpretation ... may cause it to become all-out even though both sides intend 
to limit it." His solution was an agreement by both sides to set boundaries for the 
limitation o f wars.*®
This view was echoed by Bernard Brodie in 1959, who stated that "we shall 
have to work very hard to keep [war] limited. We should be willing to limit 
objectives because we want to keep the war limited, and not the other way 
around," because total war in a thermonuclear environment was "simply too 
unthinkable."*®
His criticism of the 'graduated deterrence' scheme employing "tactical" 
nuclear weapons was that "it is much easier to distinguish between use and non-
*® Taylor, Uncertain Trumpet, p. 8.
**Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years (2 Vols.T (Heinemann, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 336.
*^  “NSC 5906/1” (November 10, 1960), p. 8, in Basic Documents, p. 234. [italics added]
*® e.g. "NSC 5501", p. 11; also "NSC 5810/1", (July 30, 1958), p. 3, in Basic Documents . p. 195. 
*"* NSC 5602, pp. 23-24, in Basic Documents, pp. 147-148.
*® Kissinger, p. 185
*® Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p. 313.
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use of nuclear weapons than between the use of a nuclear weapon below some 
arbitrary limit and one well above that limit." *" Or, put another way, the Soviets 
would not be too likely to pause to get out a 'nuclear measuring tape' at the sight 
of a mushroom cloud. Soviet attitude to "limited" nuclear war was extremely 
hostile and derisive; unsurprising, given their preponderance o f conventional 
forces. Thus, an explicit negotiation on their use was unlikely, even if the 
administration had sought it.*® The worry was not just about Soviet retaliation 
using larger nuclear weapons, but about the willingness of US indigenous allies 
to support atomic use, even in a limited sense, which might cause those allies to 
become more afraid of the US intervention on their behalf than of communist 
aggression. 'Better Red than dead', so to speak. Brodie put it succinctly when he 
remarked that, "A people "saved" by us through our free use o f nuclear weapons 
over their territories would probably be the last that would ever ask us to help 
them. We might have to insist on rescuing future victims of aggression even 
against their will, but it will not be a good diplomatic position to be in." *®
And yet, the "last analysis" o f the NSC, at least on paper, was nuclear 
release ahead of communist expansion.; despite Eisenhower's universalism and 
Dulles' preaching on collective security, national security policy was still, "in the 
event of actual Communist local aggression," for, "the United States... if 
necessary [to] make its own decision as to the use of nuclear weapons."^® There 
were doubts, in private, even in the President's mind by the end of the New Look 
era as to the viability of his own strategy. In August 1960, he admitted that "the 
more the services depend on nuclear weapons the dimmer ... the hope of gets to 
contain any limited war or keep it spreading to general war."^* This was a far cry 
from the public optimism of Dulles in 1957, writing in Foreign Affairs that 
nuclear weapons "need not involve vast destruction and widespread harm to 
humanity," whereas Soviet "propaganda" was all that made the nuclear weapon 
cause for "horror."
So if nuclear war could not be kept limited, what then ? A return to the 
expenses o f NSC and 'flexible response', or a real ‘step back’ in policy to the 
Truman years of parsimony ? Defense Secretary McElroy in 1959 pessimistically
*" Brodie, p. 323.
*® For example. Colonel V. Mochalov & Major V. Dashichev, "The Smoke-screen o f the American 
Imperialists," Red Star , (December 17, 1957), cited in Brodie, p. 322.
*" Brodie, p. 325.
"NSC 5602", p. 6, in Basic Documents . p. 130. [italics added]
*^ "Eisenhower conversation with Kristiakowsky and others", August 24, 1960, Eisenhower Papers. 
(Whitman File : DDE Diary, Box 33, "Aug 60"), cited in Gaddis, p. 174.
John Foster Dulles, “Challenge and Response in U.S. Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs. Vol. 36 
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suggested that US policy "really had to be that of massive retaliation."^®
Radford, however, an original proponent of the New Look and still a 
supporter of tactical nuclear weapon use, decided to remind Eisenhower that "the 
reason we can intervene in many areas quickly with force is that we can do this 
with small forces which, armed with atomic weapons, are not in danger o f being 
wiped out."^‘* According to historians such as Kissinger, Gaddis/® Brodie and 
Baer, graduated deterrence was too much o f a risk. It relied too much on 
Eisenhower's own self-assurance to be a 'long-term policy.' But it also reflected 
the superiority the US still enjoyed over the Soviet Union. "They're not ready for 
war and they know it," said Eisenhower in 1955. "... if they go to war they're 
going to lose everything they have. T h a t... tends to make people conservative.”®® 
The implication was that both sides had as much to lose as each other, so in the 
end, it all came right back down to Dulles' policy of "Boldness", versus the 
alternative of conventional force build-up.
The Navy, of course, was still trying to be as flexible as possible, within the 
confines of the national strategy. Navy Secretary Charles Thomas, at the 
launching o f the Forrestal in 1954, described the new supercarrier as “the 
country’s most versatile and most desirable weapon in our modern arsenal, due to 
its multi-role capability.”®® Constant modernisation o f naval forces was the 
watchword under Eisenhower’s Defence policy, which -  as indicated by the 
president’s memoirs and the NSC -  demanded modern weapons as the substitute 
for manpower. So the Navy did receive funds for systems such as the 
supercarrier, heavier jets, and guided missile escorts to protect their striking 
power. But shipbuilding costs were rising as a result of the new technologies 
being purchased,®® and manpower did indeed give way as a result. In 1954 there 
were a total of 1080 ships in the Navy, and nearly 10,000 aircraft, sticking 
closely to the numbers advocated by the Joint Chiefs in their recommendations as 
to the formation o f New Look forces for the years leading up to 1957 and 
thereafter.®® By 1957 though, that manpower had been reduced even further and
®® "Cabinet Meeting", Marcb 13, 1959, Eisenhower Papers (Whitman File: DDE Diary, Box 25, "Staff 
Notes, Marcb 1-15, 59", in Gaddis, p. 174.
®'* "Eisenbower-Radford conversation", July 14, 1959, Eisenhower Papers. Box 27, "Staff Notes,
July 59", in Gaddis, p. 175.
®® Gaddis, p. 175.
®® Op. Cit., citing "James Hagerty Diary", February 8, 1955, Hagertv Papers. Box 1( Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Library)
®® John R. Wadleigb, “Charles Sparks Thomas”, in Paolo E. Coletta (ed.), American Secretaries o f the 
N aw . Vol. lf(U .S . Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 863.
®® Op. Cit., p. 862.
®® see Radford Memoirs, pp. 324-325 for summarisation o f the JCS outline. For ship numbers : US 
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so had the fleet; perhaps unavoidably considering the combination of a relatively 
fixed budget, the continuation of the supercarrier program, the start o f the Polaris 
program, and the ageing of most other World War II vintage ships (including the 
modernised attack carriers), that the Navy still relied upon.
The Navy had to keep in mind that modernisation was becoming more 
rapid, and technology advancing at an exponential rate on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain, even if America was slightly ahead. Thus the navy considered two 
responses to changing world affairs : a more modern Navy, and a flexible 
strategy that would keep it in a job, and well supported, with regard to the New 
Look. Indeed, as early as 1954, the Navy under Thomas was beginning to look 
towards having more balanced forces, as far as possible :
If we channel our military effort to only one type o f possible military aggression -  as we 
bad begun to do just prior to Korea -  we ignore the threats o f other types o f military aggression, 
which can be just as defeating and just as conclusive. Moreover, in doing so, we permit any 
enemy to concentrate bis effort on circumventing our single strength. Thus in these days o f  
supersonic planes, nuclear weapons, and guided missiles we must still have soldiers and sailors 
... antisubmarine ships and landing craft as we so recently saw in Korea, as well as global 
bombers and massive retaliatory weapons.®*
Considering this speech, it is less than surprising that Thomas chose 
Arleigh Burke as the man to lead the Navy “into the tomorrow”, passing by 92 
more senior officers to promote an advocate of the navy’s traditional mission of 
sea control over the strategic mission. He assumed office in July 1955®®, after 
which the navy started to push for the limited war role of intervention against 
local aggression postulated by the NSC. In September 1955, Burke received a 
memo from his Deputy for Fleet Operations and Readiness echoing Thomas’s 
speech of the previous year :
For the past several years we have been conditioning our armed forces to handle nothing 
but an all-out war accompanied by a liberal sprinkling of atomic and thermonuclear weapons by 
both sides. All our thoughts have been channeled toward bow we can best project our atoms
th  St
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against the enemy while at the same time preventing him from projecting his atoms against us...
Thermonuclear warheads in the Soviets’ possession were a scary thing to 
have ‘projected’ at a surface ship. There was an alternative, though. Referring to 
the Korean War and Indochina, the memo concluded that,
In the ten years since World War II our principal problem has not been all out atomic war. 
On the contrary, what we have been faced with is daily is the peripheral type war, the brush fire 
wherein atomic weapons have not been used and probably could not be used without risking 
expansion into an all out atomic war. And this may be the type o f war with which we will be 
faced for many years to come. In fact, there is growing doubt in the minds o f many officers that 
we will ever become involved in an atomic exchange unless we allow ourselves to get in a 
position where we are not equipped to fight any other war.®®
In keeping with this line of thinking, and with the worries o f the NSC in 
NSC 5602, Burke asserted in a letter to Charles Wilson that the Soviet potential 
to negate US strategic superiority meant that the US should keep future conflicts 
within certain bounds, recommending greater resources to the conduct o f war 
which might remain non-nuclear. He echoed the statement above that limited 
wars were the most likely to occur in the future, but included the caveat that a 
strong nuclear deterrent was necessary to prevent all out war as well.®'*
The great asset of the attack carrier - especially the new Forrestah 
accompanied by guided missile cruisers for longer-range protection than guns 
could provide, to facilitate the destruction of enemy atomic bombers -  was that 
they were able to fit in with both types o f warfare -  both the brushfire and 
general wars. But now the Planning Division was beginning to take more notice 
o f the peripheral conflict as a role for the carrier. Indeed, one naval officer 
suggested that the Navy be the “champion of limited war and preparedness for 
it.”®®
Perhaps significantly, in the same month this memo was received, Thomas 
was giving Raborn his Special Projects office to develop Polaris.®® Polaris, as has 
been stated, was a massive undertaking in terms of cost and effort, but despite
®® Secret [declassified], Op343, serial 00368P34 “New Concept o f Amphibious Operations Warfare; 
Requirements for Support of,” 21 Sept 1955, A3 Folder, 1955, Strategic Plans Division , (Subject and 
Serial Files, Operational Archives (OA) NHC), cited in Gray & Barnett (eds.), Seapower and Strategv, 
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®^* “Letter, CNO to SecD ef’, serial 012P00, ( November 6, 1956), Burke MSS, NHC, cited in Edward J. 
Marolda, “The Influence o f Burke’s Boys Upon Lnnited War”, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
(August 1981), p. 37.
®® Op. Cit., citing Commander Malcohn W. Cagle.
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exemplary progress, it would also take time. The navy would still rely on carriers 
for a nuclear strike role, and all the C VAs were capable of launching the new 
heavy attack bombers such as the A3D Skywarrior before the first Polaris was 
test-fired.®®
Burke had remarked that he was serving, “in an era marked by the most 
rapid technological changes in the history of the Navy,”®® and he was trying to 
steer the navy’s carrier force away from a strategic role at preeisely the same 
period that the administration required highly mobile, flexible task forces, which 
in fact, the carrier task force was. As Burke said in 1961, “ Naval Forces are 
essentially self-contained offensively, defensively, and logistically. This staying 
power is an important feature of our modern navy, which ensures that United 
States strength and influence can always be exerted where and when needed ,”®^
Consider the following eomplaint though, from Maxwell Taylor, 
commenting on a National Security Council meeting of July 1957, when he was 
serving as the Army Chief o f Staff; he asserts that, “Secretary Wilson decided to 
produce virtually single-handed a long-range program for presentation to the 
National Security Council.”
He reportedly depended upon Admiral Radford [and others]... [but] the Joint Chiefs bad 
no band in it.
Whatever the precise authorship... it bit the services like a bombshell. The service 
secretaries and the Chiefs o f Staff learned o f its existence only three days before its presentation 
for approval by the national Security Council. It covered the period 1959-1961 and undertook to 
bold the annual defense budget at approxnnately $38 billion by reducing manpower to 
compensate for the rising cost o f military equipment.
Specifically, the overall military manpower was to decrease fi-om 2,500,000 men to 
2,200,000 men in 1961.'*®
Taylor went on to describe the presentation as unjustifled in the way that it 
emphasised atomic use “when it was generally agreed that the order of 
probability o f future nuclear challenge was : first, cold war, second; conflict short 
of general war; finally general war.”'**
®® Op. Cit., p. 881.
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Taylor had realised that the navy was moving toward the Army position by 
the time his memoirs were written, but saw them as a service “having a stake in 
the role o f Massive Retaliation..."
[The Navy] had been hesitant to support the Ibnited war theory, although inclined to agree 
in principle. For one thing, the navy saw the possibilities of the nuclear-powered submarine with 
underwater-launcbed-missiles and foresaw a new role as a preponderant part o f the atomic 
retaliatory force. But on the other band, it bad a claim on a part o f the Ibnited war mission, which 
it hoped to expand.'*®
The army was the big loser in the budgets under the New Look, whereas 
the Navy budget remained constant at around 29% throughout the Eisenhower 
period.'*® Taylor stated why he thought the navy was faring better ; its flexibility:
The navy fights bard for the preservation o f its present large carrier force, attempting to 
justify its numbers by the requirements of both general and Ibnited war. ... The navy prefers to 
advance upon three parallel lines, seeking to expand its role in strategic bombardment and Ibnited 
ground warfare while retaining its responsibility for antisubmarine warfare. '*'*
Taylor and Burke were part of a JCS team which criticised the Air Force 
for taking too much of the defence budget and spending all o f it on an all-out war 
strategy in which their bases were obvious targets for a first strike, especially 
after the scare the US received when the Russians launched their first Sputnik. 
Nuclear war was soon to become a no-win situation.'*® The Navy was assured of 
its strategic role by virtue o f Polaris, though; an ‘invulnerable’ system which was 
well hidden underwater. Thus it was unnecessary to purchase large amounts of 
missile submarines, because Soviet thermonuclear attack would not be able to 
pinpoint Polaris submarines. In 1959, when the SAC had 3000 bombers and 1000 
tanker planes, and some 3261 points on its target list, the navy could propose 232 
targets to be covered by 29 submarines loaded with 16 missiles each to be a force 
“sufficient to destroy all o f Russia.”'*® Therefore, the navy thought it could afford 
to concentrate on the limited war problem .
The navy’s Long Range Objectives Group (Op-93), produced a report at 
the end of 1957 which condemned the graduated deterrence concept as making
42 Op. Cit., p. 59.
'*® Baer, pp. 350-351.
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'*® David Alan Rosenberg, “Tbe Origins o f Overkill ; Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945- 
I960,” International Security. Vol. 7, part 4, (Spring 1983), pp. 37, 50-51.
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“general war more likely to occur, and endangers US security by alienating allies 
and diverting resources from conventional preparedness,” and should therefore be , 
“subject to challenge.”'*®
In January the next year, Op-93, produced a long-range planning study 
which it thought would provide the answer; “The Navy of the 1970-Era” .'*® Burke 
agreed, arguing that “one reason why we resist inflating our retaliatory forces is 
the urgency and magnitude of the limited war problem.”'*^ He saw that the US 
was getting involved in armed struggles further and further away from the global 
power centres Kennan had originally intended to defend, but that Eisenhower’s 
policy was universal. Thus Burke could feel justified in saying that it was more 
likely that “the fulcrum of the struggle will be in the undeveloped areas of the 
free world -  from the Asian periphery through the Middle East and Africa to 
Latin America.”®® In any of these places the US might be required to intervene in 
a limited conflict.
For the combined tasks of providing for the deterrent Polaris fleet, 
providing sea control, and for providing for limited intervention abroad, the US 
Navy would need a fleet of 933 ships and 7000 aircraft.®* Although the carriers 
would still have a nuclear role in a general war, it was becoming obvious that 
Polaris could take over from the strike carrier, which then might be less exposed 
to Soviet stand-off defences. But as long as Polaris was incomplete, the carrier 
still had a role to play. Supercarriers could still serve as auxiliary platforms with 
regard to the strategic role, or “a continuing, flexible, alternate capability,” as 
Burke would put it. He continued, though that he wanted to make it clear that,
[F]or 1970 we are optimizing the carrier force for limited war, to be the nation’s primary 
cutting tool for this purpose. The deterrence o f all-out war will not then be the carriers’ nmnber 
one job. The carrier force need not measure up to the defensive requirements o f that role in 1970, 
however useful it may be in that context in the next few years.®®
Vice Admiral Wallace Beakley, the Deputy CNO for Operations, told
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Congress that “the carrier’s contribution to the [strategic retaliatory] mission is 
strictly a bonus and in no way detracts from its essentiality for naval purposes.”®® 
This had been the view of Burke and other navy planners all throughout the 50s, 
but now it was given air because of the limited war role the navy wanted for its 
carriers, closely following the NSC documents which, thanks to Burke and Op- 
93, did indeed split the Navy into the two elements detailed in NSC 5501 and 
following documents.
But rather than the graduated deterrence strategy promulgated by the NSC, 
the navy was keeping war limited, and on the periphery for its carriers in the 
future as much as possible, This was why it required so many ships and aircraft. 
The navy’s carriers were to be the “point of the spear” for the US mobile reserve 
force.®"
Carrier on the Periphery : Deterrence or Containment
James Cable states that ground and tactical air forces often need contiguous 
allies to access the territory of their victim, and more importantly perhaps, that 
the sea "offers a neutral place d ’armes open to all, where forces may be 
assembled, ready for intervention but not yet committed... a ship that has 
approached the victim's coast, even a fleet that has entered territorial waters, is a 
lesser involvement than a platoon that has crossed the frontier."®®
This was a special advantage to be added to the fact that carrier forces were 
self-contained offensive and defensive fighting units. But considering that 
Eisenhower placed so much emphasis on deterrence and nuclear weapons was 
there a case for the large carrier in an increased conventional role; were carriers 
for use for deterrence or intervention under his administration ?
According to John Lewis Gaddis, "it is clear in retrospect that the 
administration was prepared to 'go nuclear'," in several peripheral circumstances, 
including the Quemoy Matsu crises of 1954-5 and 1958, an outbreak of renewed 
hostilities in Korea, and if a decision was made to intervene in Indochina.®® 
Gaddis makes the criticism that the US range of choice with regard to 
intervention was determined largely by its allies; and this was certainly true in
®® Cited in Edward J. Marolda, “The Influence o f Burke’s Boys Upon Limited War”, U.S. Naval 
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82
the case of Indochina.®®
The ease with which carriers could be deployed to the periphery without 
major diplomatic problems was demonstrated in February 1954, when CNO 
Carney deployed 2 carriers and escorting destroyers to conduct training exercises 
“as a cover for possible operations to assist the French in Indochina if such 
operations should become necessary,” adding that the “task force should be ready 
to render prompt assistance during the time they are in the South China Sea.”®® 
With regard to intervention there, Carney assured the force commander that 
“there is an approved expression of national policy recognizing the grave 
consequences that could result from loss of Indochina to the Communists.”®® 
There were, however, conditions for US intervention in Indochina, which 
had to be met before the president would go before Congress and ask to 
intervene. They included US military participation being requested by France, the 
Associated States, the Philippines; that the ANZUS treaty would be invoked; that 
the UK would be at least acquiescent; that France would guarantee independence 
to the Associated States; and that French troops would remain in-country. The 
US intervention would be supplementary, by sea and air primarily; native troops 
would have to be trained, and a command structure agreed upon.®® Quite a list 
indeed, but one that spawned from the US reliance on allies, and from the 
position that, when combating communism, the US had to be seen as a liberator, 
not an imperialistic power enforcing its will on others. The unilateral bailing out 
of a colonising nation was therefore out of the question.
According to Radford - at this point the Chairman o f the JCS - there were 
major problems with the French government. “Principally air and sea” meant to 
the French upwards o f 6 marine divisions, and there were not even that many 
marine divisions in existence; only three under the New Look!®*
Still, it was the US opinion that Southeast Asia was not militarily 
defensible after the loss of all Indochina to the communists. The problem was 
that the US did not want another Korea on its hands, hence the JCS 
disassociating itself from any cease-fire in advance of a political settlement. One 
potential powder-keg in the region - Korea - was enough.®® The JCS therefore 
recommended that US contributions be limited to the fast carrier task force and
®® Gaddis, pp. 171-172.
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USAF land-based bombers based outside the country, in Okinawa/®
As Radford reveals, the JCS knew that the real problem lay in the 
neutralisation of communist China, the Vietminh’s main supporter. ®"The JCS 
also noted that ‘'involvement in Indochina, even on a limited scale, increased the 
risk o f  a general war. ” They recommended that any involvement be 
accompanied by increased mobilisation at home.®® Intervention therefore, was by 
sea and air or not at all. On May 21, the JCS rejected plans for a static defence of 
Indochina as a “gift to the USSR”, similar to that which Korea had been.
Radford, it has already been noted, was not a fan o f that conflict.®® Ridgway 
warned that intervention in that sense would involve a million troops and 
expensive construction projects if it were to be feasible.®®
The upshot was that many, the British and French included, were confused 
about US policy. Would they intervene against aggression or not? As Clement 
Attlee commented, “Sometimes it is awfully hard to understand what the 
American line is, as between what members of the government say and ... what 
generals and admirals say.”®®This was not the whole story though: with regard to 
the adverse French position at Dien Bien Phu, Carney concluded that 
conventional ordnance would be o f limited effectiveness against the Vietminh, 
and atomic weaponry might harm the French as much as aid them. ®® Still, nearly 
300 planes on 3 CVAs stood by, just in case China decided to send troops into 
the region, in which case the situation might have differed.®®
At the end of it all there was no US intervention at all and the country was 
split in two. The US position at this time was that resistance to communism 
needed popular support, and that peoples supported should be defending their 
own institutions. In this case, it wasn’t the Indochinese the US were “liberating” 
but the French, and despite Eisenhower’s universalistic speeches, Kennan’s “we 
have some communists... now come across” position still held true. An ally doing 
too little for its own defense was outside the New Look’s lookout.
At the opposite end of the spectrum lay the Formosa Strait crises, where as 
far as the US was concerned, their ally was behaving too aggressively. Taiwan 
and the US had signed a mutual defense treaty on 2 December 1954, so attacks 
on Quemoy, Matsu and the Tachens required Eisenhower to go before Congress
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to secure the Formosa Resolution on January 29 the next year, whereby Congress 
gave the President authorisation to use force against the Chinese, using his own 
judgement as to when it became appropriate to do so.®*
Given official support from Congress, the Taiwan Crises were a more 
fundamental test of the US resolve, and the ability o f the Navy to respond. Unlike 
Indochina, Taiwan was one of the island bastions proposed for the original 
containment barrier, and its loss would be a real blow. Carney and Radford 
supported strikes against the mainland in the event of an all-out Chinese attack, 
and the US 7th Fleet, in 1955, was the only barrier between China and Taiwan, 
except a SAC launch. ®®
Red Chinese aircraft started bombing the islands in 1954, and although the 
Quemoy and Matsu groups were held due to perceived (by Chiang Kai-Chek) 
military importance - they acted as barriers to two important mainland ports. The 
Tachens were evacuated from under the guns of the Chinese mainland over an 
85-hour period. The deterrent presence o f a 5 carrier US Fleet caused the attacks 
to halt completely, so there was no US-China air battle, although there were 
isolated incidents from time to time. ®® There was no need for an air-strike - 
atomic or otherwise - upon the mainland, as the 7th Fleet proceeded to take on 
board 27,000 people, 8600 tons of equipment, 166 heavy guns and some 100 
vehicles. It was an impressive display of American naval power, which attracted 
favourable attention the world over.®"Thus the Navy backed up the threat of 
massive retaliation in the early 50s with a kind of mobility and readiness the 
other services could not provide. Even if the Air Force was the main provider of 
the strategic strike, the Navy had atomic striking power too, and also the ability 
to help allies directly in this case; naval presence with an atomic dimension 
meant that the NSC’s stark choice between retreat and nuclear release did not 
come to pass. And the executive at the time did believe that nuclear weapons 
would have to be used in the event of an attack.®® This was inadvertently revealed 
to the public when a reporter leaked an off-the-record statement by Carney that, 
if  an all-out attack occurred, he had been authorised to destroy communist 
China’s industrial base.®®
Yet the “Carney leak” may have heen useful to the ends of American foreign policy . For
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some reason, Peking suddenly ended the bombardment... and sought a relaxation o f tensions in 
the Taiwan Strait.®®
The US Navy in the first half of the New Look era, then, got along quite 
well without having to launch any air-strikes against communists on the 
periphery. Intervention was accomplished in the Formosa Strait without recourse 
to testing the capabilities of US Navy atomic strike planes. It could be said that 
the navy deterred China both from intervening openly against the French, and 
from invading the Chinese Nationalists and causing a lapse in containment. The 
navy was unable to prevent partition of Indochina though, but the imposition of 
so many conditions on US allies by the executive precluded US intervention in 
the first place. That was hardly the navy’s fault.
The second half of the New Look era saw Chiang Kai-Chek behaving too 
aggressively for the administration’s liking in 1958, especially considering the 
Soviet scientific advances which had taken place in the intervening years. He was 
basing a third of his ground forces on the remaining offshore islands of Quemoy 
and Matsu, just miles away from major concentrations o f the Chinese military. ®®
An Eisenhower aide had noted the probable process o f escalation with 
regard to US involvement in the Formosa Strait by the end of the previous crisis:
We all believe the Chi-coms are building up to an attack on Matsu and Quemoy and ... it 
will be inevitable that our military units will become involved for this reason : i f  the communists 
attack the islands in force, Chiang’s Air Force will immediately go into action, ...[then] the 
communists ... [,] will attack Formosan airports. Once this happens, under our treaty obligations, 
the United States Air Force units go into action since an attack on Formosa would oblige us to do 
so.®®
The August 1958 bombardment was therefore an attack on American 
resolve. If a conflict arose, the government would, according to CINCPAC Felix 
Stump, have to “stop pussy footing around about the use of nuclear weapons,” 
because Chiang had already “insisted that we must use our atomic capability, 
but... [expressed] disturbing doubts about our willingness to do so.”®®
Again the 7th Fleet was the barrier to an invasion. For both the 
administration and the Navy, the containment policy was once more at stake. 
Burke stated that.
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President Chiang can’t give up those islands and we can’t ask him to... If we retreat under 
pressure, where does that leave us in the eyes o f the world - and our own eyes ?®*
The national policy was clear. Atomic release over communist expansion, 
even if the islands weren’t too important to the US. They were important to a US 
ally, and there was no question o f a colonial nature here. And the leader o f the 
state was actually requesting nuclear assistanee. But this was an era of nuelear 
plenty, and Nikita Khrushchev warned that “to touch off a war against People’s 
China means to doom to certain death sons of the American people and spark off 
the conflagration of a world war.”®®
Notable by their absence during probably the greatest crisis o f the New 
Look Era were the supercarriers. Three smaller CVAs were in place within 4 
days though, and they covered Taiwan’s airports so the Nationalist fighters could 
conduct an air-to-air only campaign . More reinforcements included heavy 
eruiser escorts, the Midway and Essex and their escorts, and a CVS carrier for 
antisubmarine operations.
The Essex had sailed from the Mediterranean to reach the Straits, even 
though the Forrestal was deployed there simultaneously. There was a US 
limited intervention o f sorts again, this time including a resupply of the islands 
under fire; covered by the CVAs and their nuclear-armed bombers, US ships 
escorted the Nationalists up to 3 miles off the island of Quemoy and met with no 
artillery fire, although within that limit. Nationalist ships were targeted and one 
destroyed. By the end of September the convoys were getting through regularly 
enough, and on October 25, the Communists undertook a policy o f bombardment 
on alternate days, allowing easy resupply. Any active intervention was 
unnecessary after this relaxation of tensions, which marked the end o f the second 
crisis. The fleet retired.®"
In fact, no supercarrier entered the Far East until 1959,®® when there was 
cover in the Mediterranean. There, in the summer of 1958, supporting the 
Eisenhower Doctrine - or Middle East Resolution®® - the hard-working Essex had 
given elose-air cover to marines going ashore near Beruit as part o f a foree to 
stabilise the pro-Westem government of Lebanon. The presence of the 6th Fleet
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provided an ‘umbrella’ for the operation at a greater distance, too. Again, no 
serious communist resistance was encountered, but the significance o f the 
operation was the speed at which it was carried out: 13 hours from the order from 
Eisenhower, marines had been deployed ashore, and in significant numbers - 
nearly 6000 marines were ashore at the height o f the Lebanese instability. With 
the marines and later the army present, any kind of coup was impossible, and the 
US kept a uniquely pro-Western ally in the Middle East.®®
Limited Wan Limited Carriers
The limited war Navy proposed by Burke was part of a navy strategy which 
stressed mobile and flexible striking forces, but also the navy’s constant priority 
o f sea control. Burke was keen to point out the Navy’s mobility in 1961, but he 
grounded it in terms of the ability to support a conflict overseas first :
... in time of war ... no matter what kind o f military power we project overseas -  naval, 
ground or air -  we are going to have to use the seas to sustain that power.
And that means we must be able to control the seas, that we must keep them free for our 
use and to deny that use to any enemy. Control o f the seas is the navy’s primary mission...
A ll o f our naval forces have the tremendous advantage o f mobility. Moving at sea our 
ships have no fixed address. They cannot be targeted in advance, fo r  attack by long-range 
ballistic missiles.
POLARIS is not our only seagoing asset for nuclear war. In addition, our powerful, 
versatile attack carriers contribute to our country’s retaliatory capability. These carriers and their 
attack aircraft fonn the backbone of our naval striking power: power that can be projected 
overseas, power that can carry the fight to the enemy, power that can he used in wars o f every 
kind...
... aggressors are apt to strike in areas where we are not so well covered, in areas far away 
from concentration o f land-based American fighting power. And that is why our mobile naval 
forces are so very important. Our Navy/Marine Corps amphibious capability, one unique to the 
United States, can supply armed strength from the sea ready to figh t...
Naval Forces are essentially self-contained offensively, defensively, and logistically. This 
staying power is an important feature of our modem navy, which ensures that United States 
strength and influence can always he exerted where and when needed .®®
®® For details, see Arleigh Burke, “The Lebanon Crisis”, in Arnold R. Shapack (ed.). Naval History 
Symposium - The N aw  in an Era o f Change and Crisis. (U.S. Naval Academy, 1973), pp. 70-80.
®® “Address by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN, Chief o f Naval Operations, Armed Forces Day -  Salt 
Lake City, Utah -  17 May 1961”; “SPEE-8” File, Papers o f Admiral Arleigh A. Burke. Operational
88
The ‘Navy o f the 1970-Era’ had proposed that 6 out of 12 supercarriers be 
nuclear-powered for maximum mobility, along with 12 of 18 guided missile 
cruisers and 18 o f 54 frigates/^ By 1961 the only nuclear carrier in the fleet was 
the Enterprise (CVAN-65), but Burke was enthusiastic about her capabilities ;
Her eight powerful nuclear reactors would enable the Enterprise to cruise 20 times around 
the world without refueling. Her great endurance and her advanced hull design would allow the 
ship to make this extraordinary journey at sustained high speed, exploiting to its utmost the 
seagoing advantage o f mobility.®®
Indeed, mobility was stressed by her first captain after commissioning:
“Propulsion and control characteristics of the ship offer great tactical flexibility,” said 
Capt. de Poix in mid-1962. “There are four rudders, one almost directly astern o f each propeller. 
This provides excellent maneuverability at all speeds as well as tactical diameters in turns which 
compare with much smaller ships. . . .
“Her ability to launch a strike on the enemy from one position, recover, and launch another 
24 hours later from an unpredictable position more than 800 miles away from her previous strike 
position will constantly be a factor in causing the enemy to utilize protective forces that could be 
deployed elsewhere.
“If a show o f force is required. Enterprise can be on distant station in a shorter period of  
time than any other ship in the Fleet.”®*
But there was a problem in the Navy : aging ships were causing the fleet to 
shrink year by year instead of grow to the 1970 targets proposed by Burke, The 
Navy had 376 major warships in 1960 as opposed to the target of 537 for 1970.®® 
In a private conversation, the president said he had “lost faith” in the large 
nuclear carriers due to the evolution of Soviet air defences. Attack-at-source, 
high-altitude heavy bombers would be phased out in favour o f the all-weather A- 
6 Intruder, a medium attack plane which could penetrate defences by ‘hugging 
the ground’ to avoid Soviet radar. Accurate Soviet SAMs had made the high- 
altitude bombers too vulnerable in the meantime, which made attack at source
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too risky.®® Without a sea control function in general war, and with no Soviet 
carriers to oppose, the carriers’ main job appeared to be intervention, which in 
the main had been fulfilled by the smaller CVAs.®" Another issue was cost. The 
nuclear ships might have been modern, but also represented the substitution of 
quantity with modernity. They cost approximately 1.5 times as much as their 
conventional supercarrier counterparts. The Independence, for example, cost 
$189 million, and the first Forrestal $218 million, compared with an estimated 
$472 million for the Enterprise in February I960.®® The Navy could substitute 
two Forrestals for one Enterprise at those prices, putting the advantages o f the 
ship into the shade somewhat. For the Navy the flight decks were more important 
than the propulsion plants.®® The Navy decided to study the possibilities though, 
in a treatise on nuclear power, which slightly more optimistically had the cost 
ratio at 1.5 times that of a conventional carrier, although its endurance, even at 
high speed, was almost unlimited by virtue o f never having to refuel. The 
independence from logistics required definition, though. Carriers still had to 
refuel their aviation squadrons. It was found that an oil-burning carrier could 
operates its air groups for four days without replenishment, a nuclear carrier for 
five or six.®® The decision on the next carrier’s propulsion system was a foregone 
conclusion, with Burke and Wallace Beakley, and Gates (now Defense Secretary) 
and William Franke, the new Navy Secretary, all coming out in favour of the oil- 
fired carrier for the future.®®
And the Navy needed the ships. As early as 1954, there were complaints 
about the forward operations taking their toll on the 6th and 7th Fleets. Admiral 
Donald B. Duncan told Radford in 1954 that.
The deployment o f 4 CVA to the Far Eastern command is the most difficult to maintain. It 
has now been extended for over two years. To continue it, ships have heen switched from ocean 
to ocean, somethnes temporarily, at other times permanently...®®
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James Cable explains the fact further when he says that carriers are 
particularly susceptible to the demands of modernisation, and tend to spend long 
periods in dock when being serviced. He postulates that ideally, “a total strength 
of 3 carriers is thus needed to be sure that [one] can, at short notice, keep one 
carrier on continuous surveillance of uncertain duration.”*®® He goes on to say, 
quite correctly, that the US Navy had more obligations to fulfill than any other. 
Only a fraction of its power could be diverted to an emergency. *®* The navy had a 
grand total o f 26 CVAs of all types, *®^ and was attempting to keep 4 Fleets in 
action, in the Mediterranean and the Far East, backed up by the 1st and 2nd 
Fleets in both oceans, Atlantic and Pacific. Little chance then, of achieving 
Cable’s target of a 3 to 1 ratio for deployments, especially with ships rapidly 
approaching the end o f their days, a constant budget, and the rising costs of New 
Look insistence on modernity. So the Navy, by the 60s, couldn’t afford to buy 
more expensive ships under the New Look and keep up shipbuilding in other 
parts of the fleet, including the all-important Polaris program.
Conclusions
So what was the Navy’s mission? The atomic strategic striking demanded 
by the likes of Nimitz and Radford before the Unification and Strategy Hearings? 
Or Sherman’s sea control mission of attack at the source? And what about the 
limited war roles o f intervention and deterrence, or the diplomatic mission of 
showing the flag? The answer is, to one extent or the other, all o f the above. The 
versatility of the carrier was what set it apart from the all-out war only mission of 
the SAC. The navy was a mobile, self-contained force as Arleigh Burke quite 
rightly highlighted. Clark G. Reynolds separated the Navy into two distinct 
functions along the lines of the Polaris / Carrier split - Deterrence and 
Intervention, respectively, although admitting the roles overlapped.
As we have seen, the Polaris missile and submarine were designed for a 
purely deterrent role, at the expense of sea control systems. Arleigh Burke’s 
choice o f weapons system - and thus choice of strategy -  had for once not the sea 
control mission as a priority but what he described as finite deterrence. Despite 
some in the Navy objecting to the decision to build the Polaris, especially
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Zumwalt’s assertion that it was the worst weapons choice possible, it was 
certainly a more viable choice of weapon than, say , the nuclear-powered attack 
carrier. If the Navy wanted a deterrence mission, then Polaris was ideal: a system 
that could survive a Russian nuclear strike better than the SAC bombers at their 
bases. But, as has been mentioned, the first Polaris didn’t see service until the 
very end of the decade.
In essence then, the Navy’s priority for the atomic weapon since Admiral 
Forrest Sherman proposed the strategy for the United States , was one o f sea 
control, and the attack at source of naval-oriented targets. The Naval planning 
literature is consistent in its sea control priority, and despite the criticisms of the 
other services, the Navy was always more interested in controlling the seas than 
taking over the role of another service. An extremely interesting paradox that 
may have been overlooked though, was that the navy’s nuclear weapon strategy 
for sea control was finally superseded by the finite deterrence concept of the 
Navy’s most persistent sea control advocate, Arleigh Burke. His was the 
insistence that a strategic mission be “strictly a bonus,” but the move to a dual 
role of strategic backup and limited war removed the fleet’s capital ship from the 
service’s primary mission. This was the New Look at work though. In an era 
where an atomic war would be a two-way affair, as Bernard Brodie indicated, 
there was still room for the carrier. But a thermonuclear Russian bomber and 
missile force would obliterate America regardless of whether the sea lanes were 
open. Before the advent of nuclear plenty then, sea control was the watchword. 
But the carrier was an interim strategic weapon at best, right from the start, which 
had to have a sea and air control mission to protect itself before any thoughts of a 
strategic strike were possible.
Next we come to the limited war question. The Navy under Burke certainly 
wanted one, thanks to the advent of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. It must be the 
conclusion of this essay that under the New Look, the Navy ‘point o f the spear’ 
mission was strictly limited to the Lebanon excursion, though. What Cable has 
termed ‘naval suasion’ was as close as the navy usually got to a true active 
intervention. Even the navy’s smaller carriers, such as the Essex class, had, in the 
final analysis, a graduated deterrence mission, even before the concept was 
developed. The prime examples are the Taiwan crises, the Indochina deployment 
being relatively useless due to the terrain , and the fact that the New Look was a 
strategy formed to avoid such wars. Had China become involved, then nuclear 
weapon use was possible on a Massive Retaliation basis, but the atomic weapon 
was a deterrent to the great powers. Had the US used the atom bomb against the 
Vietminh, the US would have been seen as imperialist in an area where they
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needed to be seen as allies.
The first Taiwan incident was extremely important for the Navy, because it 
formed a precedent for graduated deterrence. The attack carrier, even a 
modernized Essex, thanks to the ‘tactical’ weapons supposedly comparable to 
conventional ordnance managed to block Chinese invasion o f Taiwan and its 
islands. It was essentially a massive retaliation weapon and a trip-wire backed up 
by atomic force (the Air Force bombers in Okinawa) all in one, and went on to 
prove itself as such in the second Formosa Strait crisis. The navy’s carriers in 
cold- or limited- war scenarios provided mobile sanctuary areas for allies. The 
fact that they carried nuclear weapons deterred the enemy from attacking them, 
without their having to use them. Maxwell Taylor’s assertion that the US did not 
want to even suggest the possibility that the US might employ atomic weapons 
with regard to Lebanon is not entirely sound when one considers the fact that the 
US interventionist ground force was covered by a nuclear-armed carrier force.
The US Pacific fleets especially were mobile ‘containment islands.’ Even in a 
time of atomic plenty, they controlled the conflicts they became involved with.
As symbols o f a Pax Americana they performed well. But the Navy would have 
to wait further for a true limited war mission thanks to its need for the 
supercarrier force as an ‘auxiliary strategic deterrent.’
One must conclude that the Navy should have been building smaller 
carriers from the conception of its limited war role. Tactical planes could deliver 
nuclear weaponry and, even the Essex carrier could carry heavy attack craft. But 
after the United States imbroglio, the Enterprise provided the Navy with a kind of 
catharsis. It just did so at the expense of Burke’s 900-ship navy. And even the 
Navy itself realised that the kind of mobility required for dispersal was secondary 
to making up for deployment obligations. Russia might have carried the gravest 
threat to the US, but bottling up the supercarrier into the Mediterranean cost 
Burke his flexible non-atomic response.
In closing, then, the New Look navy was versatile enough to remain 
consistently funded, and versatile enough to follow both the administration’s 
strategies: those of Massive Retaliation (at least in the Far East), and graduated 
deterrence. But only at the expense of the Navy’s desired two missions of sea 
control and conventional warfare at the end o f the period. The Strike Carrier of 
the New Look era finished up as primarily the graduated deterrence weapon the 
Navy sought to condemn. As George Baer concludes, the navy was not where its 
leaders wanted it to be, even after a decade of successful innovation and 
modernisation.*®® This was because it was tied to an administration whose
*®® Baer, p. 366.
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military was closely controlled by an ex-military president. Eisenhower, unlike 
Truman, had his own concept o f national security and had the knowledge, the 
self-confidence, and enough authority to make it stick. If, as the Navy wished, 
the carrier was to remain a ‘‘national security weapon”, then the Navy had to play 
to Eisenhower’s tune. Naval leaders such as Burke knew all too well what 
happened in 1949, and the service could have been much worse off had Burke 
attempted to push the ‘Flexible Response’ case too far under Eisenhower. In the 
end, the carrier was, at least primarily, a weapon of deterrence during the New 
Look era.
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